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Abstract
How Does Increasing the Power of Retrieval Cues Change the Experience of Remembering?
by
Oyku Uner
Master of Arts in Psychological & Brain Sciences
Washington University in St. Louis, 2018
Professor Henry L. Roediger, III
Increasing the power of retrieval cues typically enhances recall and recognition. Is this driven by
remembering, knowing, or both? The current study used the remember/know paradigm in
different recall tasks that manipulated the power of retrieval cues. In the first two experiments,
participants studied words in a semantic or phonetic context, and were tested in one of these
contexts, resulting in two match and two mismatch conditions. Participants recalled more in the
match conditions, and this was driven by remembering. In the third experiment, participants
studied multiple word lists and were tested immediately after each list with varying number of
letter cues. Participants recalled more as the strength of the lexical cues increased, and this was
driven by knowing. These findings suggest that successful retrieval can be achieved through
either remembering or knowing, supporting the functional independence of these two subjective
states of awareness.

vi

Chapter 1: Introduction
Reinstating aspects of encoding at retrieval serves as a powerful retrieval cue, and
typically enhances recall and recognition. Numerous studies have demonstrated this effect
(Tulving & Thomson, 1973; for a review see Roediger, Tekin, & Uner, 2017); however, little is
known how encoding/retrieval interactions affect states of awareness during retrieval. For
instance, when recall increases with the provision of more powerful retrieval cues, are
remembering and knowing equally responsible? The current study investigated this question by
using the remember/know paradigm (Tulving, 1985) in different word recall experiments that
manipulated the power of retrieval cues.

1.1 Encoding/Retrieval Interactions
The finding that providing more powerful retrieval cues increases recall and recognition
has been shown in many contexts. Early research in this domain focused on manipulations of
verbal context, and led to the encoding specificity principle (Tulving & Thomson, 1973) and the
transfer-appropriate processing framework (Morris, Bransford, & Franks, 1977), which are now
used to explain similar findings in other contexts as well. According to the encoding specificity
principle, what is stored when an event is encoded is not just the objective characteristics of an
event, but the subjective way in which the event is experienced. The critical point is that there is
nothing inherent in an event that determines how well it will be retrieved; instead the manner in
which the event is encoded in is important. This specific encoding determines what is stored and
what cues can be effective for its retrieval. According to the encoding specificity principle, a
retrieval cue will be effective when it taps into aspects of how the event was encoded. Tulving
and Thomson (1973) demonstrated this by having participants study and retrieve target words
1

(e.g., queen) in different contexts. When participants studied weak cue-target pairs (lady-queen)
and later generated words from strong cues (king), they often failed to recognize the target words
when they generated them. Instead, participants were more successful when they recalled given
the weak cue they originally studied a target word with. This “failure to recognize recallable
words” (p. 364) showed that a strong associate to a word is not inherently a better retrieval cue;
the context in which a target word is initially encoded greatly determines later retrieval.
Similar to the encoding specificity principle, the transfer-appropriate processing
framework emphasizes the match between encoding and retrieval conditions (Morris et al.,
1977). Morris et al. (1977) sought to reevaluate findings from levels of processing studies that
argued a deeper and more semantic encoding resulted in more successful retrieval (Craik &
Lockhart, 1972; Craik & Tulving, 1975). They argued that no encoding condition is inherently
better than another and therefore retrieval does not depend solely on the quality of encoding.
Instead, the learning goals and the nature of a test determine which encoding condition is better.
To the extent that the encoding condition is appropriate to a subsequent test and the encoding
condition can transfer to the retrieval condition, retrieval will be more successful (Morris et al.,
1977). In their experiments, participants learned target words with semantic or phonetic
acquisition tasks. For the semantic acquisition trials, participants determined whether the target
word fit into a given sentence, and for the phonetic acquisition trials, they determined whether
the target word rhymed with another word. Using a similar design, Craik and Tulving (1975)
originally showed that on a standard yes/no recognition test, words encoded with semantic
questions were recognized better than those encoded with phonetic questions. Morris et al.
(1977) argued that retrieval in the standard recognition test would be more successful for words
learned with semantic acquisition, because the standard recognition test emphasizes meaning and
2

hence is a more appropriate test for the initial semantic acquisition than it is for phonetic
acquisition. They hypothesized that if an appropriate test for phonetic acquisition was created,
then retrieval would be more successful for target words learned with phonetic acquisition. This
is in fact what they found: Half of the participants took a standard recognition test after the
acquisition phase and the other half took a rhyme recognition test. The instructions on the rhyme
recognition test asked participants to indicate a test word as previously seen if it rhymed with one
of the target words previously seen. Recognition in the standard test was higher for semantic
acquisition words, but more importantly recognition in the rhyme test was higher for phonetic
acquisition words than for semantic acquisition words, at least when the answers to the
respective orienting questions during learning were yes. These results confirmed that some
encoding conditions are not inherently better than others; they are better only when retrieval
conditions match the way the event is encoded (Morris et al., 1977).
Fisher and Craik (1977) were interested in a similar question, and they conducted three
experiments varying the match between encoding and retrieval. In their second experiment,
participants studied words with associate or rhyme cues, and were tested with associate or rhyme
cues, resulting in four conditions: associate cue at study-associate cue at test, associate cue at
study-rhyme cue at test, rhyme cue at study-associate cue at test, and rhyme cue at study-rhyme
cue at test. The first and the last were conditions in which encoding and retrieval matched, and
the middle two were those in which encoding and retrieval did not match. Fisher and Craik
(1977) showed an interaction between encoding and retrieval; recall in the matching conditions
was higher than recall in the non-matching conditions. Using a different paradigm, Jacoby
(1975) also showed a similar pattern. Participants studied a list that contained either semantically
or physically related pairs along with unrelated pairs. On a subsequent recognition test, they were
3

asked to mark the test items that were similar to the words they studied and to indicate whether
they were similar semantically or physically. Participants who studied the semantic list were
better at identifying semantically similar test items, whereas participants who studied the
physical list were better at identifying physically similar test items. A study published around the
same time by McDaniel, Friedman and Bourne (1978) provided further evidence that the
effectiveness of a particular encoding condition depends on what information is tested by the
retrieval condition. McDaniel et al. showed that participants were better at recall and auditory
recognition tests (i.e., tests that require name-code information) for the words they processed
conceptually, but they were better at a visual recognition test (i.e., a test that requires perceptual
information) for the words they processed perceptually. According to McDaniel et al. (1978),
different information about words are extracted with different kinds of processing, and similarly,
different retrieval tasks demand different information from participants. To the extent that the
information extracted during encoding is congruent with the information needed during retrieval,
participants will be more accurate. Overall, the interactions between encoding and retrieval
conditions reported in this section suggest that powerful retrieval cues are the ones that tap into
the conditions in which encoding occurred.
The studies discussed previously focus on the match between encoding and retrieval
conditions, and how reinstating aspects of encoding during retrieval serves as a powerful
retrieval cue. The power of retrieval cues, however, can also be increased gradually. In one such
experiment, Tulving and Watkins (1973) manipulated the number and nature of retrieval cues
provided to participants at test. Participants studied multiple five-letter word lists and were
immediately tested on each list. On most of the tests, they were provided with the first two, three,
four or all five letters of the words on the preceding study list as retrieval cues. They were
4

required to type in one of the words in the preceding list that the cue reminded them of. For one
of the studied lists, participants were given a surprise free recall test, where they did not receive
any cues. As expected, recall increased when the power of retrieval cues during test increased
from self-provided cues (i.e., free recall) to a very powerful cue (i.e., the word itself). Matching
encoding and retrieval conditions typically increases the power of retrieval cues and enhances
memory, but this can occur also with gradually increasing the power of retrieval cues on one
feature, in this case a lexical dimension. In the experiments reported below, the power of
retrieval cues will be increased via a match between encoding and retrieval conditions, and via
the provision of more letter cues.

1.2 Retrieval Experience
The aim of the current study is to investigate how providing powerful retrieval cues
affects retrieval experience. Of interest is whether the increased recall with the provision of more
powerful retrieval cues is related to increased remembering, knowing, or both, as measured by
the remember/know paradigm (Tulving, 1985).
Tulving (1985) measured phenomenological experience during recall and recognition by
having participants state whether they remembered or knew a word to be on the list they studied.
Remembering indicated that participants “‘remembered’ [the item’s] occurrence in the list” and
knowing indicated participants “simply ‘knew’ on some other basis that the item was a member
of the study list” (Tulving, 1985, p. 8). Tulving argued that remembering and knowing tapped
into different types of consciousness (autonoetic and noetic, respectively) that characterized
different memory systems (episodic and semantic, respectively). According to Tulving, correct
recall or recognition should be a joint product of episodic trace information and semantic cue
information. If participants recall or recognize an event based more dominantly on episodic trace
5

information, they should give more remember responses. On the other hand, if participants recall
or recognize an event based more on semantic cue information, they should give more know
responses. Tulving (1985) had participants study category names paired with an instance of the
category. The participants then took three successive tests. The first test was free recall, where
participants were asked to recall all category instances. Next, participants were given the names
of the categories and were asked to recall the category instances. Finally, participants were given
the category name with the first letter of the category instance and were asked to recall the
category instances. In all three tests, participants gave a remember or know response after each
word they recalled. Tulving argued that, from the first to the last test, episodic trace information
should decrease due to forgetting across time, while the semantic cue information should
increase. The proportion of remember and know responses supported Tulving’s argument;
remember responses decreased from the first test to the last test, while know responses increased.
Instead of considering remembering and knowing to be tapping into two memory
systems, others held a unitary view of memory (one system) and considered these judgments to
be tapping into dual-components of recognition (Graf & Mandler, 1984; Jacoby, 1983; Mandler,
1980, Yonelinas, 2002). From this point of view, remembering is associated with a conscious
recollective experience of an event, whereas knowing is associated with a feeling of familiarity
in the absence of any recollective experience (Jacoby, 1991; Mandler, 1980; Yonelinas, 2002).
For instance, one can recognize a face and remember talking to that person at a party the night
before, and remember what they were wearing or where the party was. This would be a
conscious recollective experience, and would lend itself to a remember response in a memory
experiment. On the other hand, one can also confidently recognize a face based on strong
feelings of familiarity, without having a conscious recollection of seeing the person before. This
6

is akin to Mandler’s butcher-on-the-bus phenomenon (1980), where one sees their butcher on the
bus, recognizes his face, knows they know him from somewhere but cannot identify the context.
In a memory experiment, such an experience would lend itself to a know response. Broadly,
these two experiences make a distinction between the intentional and incidental use of memory
(Jacoby, 1984), and are sometimes referred to as conceptually-driven and data-driven processes
(Jacoby, 1983), elaboration and integration (Graf & Mandler, 1984), or more commonly as
recollection and familiarity (Mandler, 1980). Both contribute to recognition, and various
experimental manipulations should change the extent to which one is used more dominantly
during retrieval.
One of the first systematic investigations of remembering and knowing was conducted by
Gardiner (1988), who showed that there is a functional distinction between each response. In two
experiments, he manipulated encoding conditions and examined how these manipulations
affected remembering and knowing on a recognition test. In the first experiment, he manipulated
levels of processing by asking participants to write down a rhyming word (i.e., shallow
processing) or a semantically related word (i.e., deep processing) to words on a study list. In the
second experiment, he asked participants to generate some of the words from a cue and to read
some of the words presented intact. Replicating prior findings, recognition was greater for words
that were deeply processed (Experiment 1) and for words that were generated (Experiment 2)
during study. Critically, both manipulations only affected remembering. Participants gave more
remember responses during recognition to words they processed more deeply compared to the
others (Experiment 1), and to words they generated compared to the words they read
(Experiment 2). In both experiments, the encoding manipulations did not affect the proportion of
know responses.
7

Further research following Gardiner (1988) showed that remember and know responses
can be dissociated and are functionally independent. Some manipulations affect only remember
but not know responses, some affect only know but not remember responses, and others have
similar or even opposite effects on the two responses (see Roediger, Rajaram & Geraci, 2007, for
a review). One early explanation of these findings was that conceptual manipulations (e.g., levels
of processing) affect remembering and perceptual manipulations (e.g., masked repetition
priming) affect knowing (Rajaram, 1993). However, later findings showed perceptual
manipulations could affect remembering and conceptual manipulations could affect knowing
(Rajaram, 1996; Rajaram & Geraci, 2000). For instance, Rajaram (1996) showed that matching
the study and test format during recognition, a perceptual manipulation, increased remember
responses. In another experiment, when participants were primed with semantically related
words before each item on a recognition test, a conceptual manipulation, they gave more know
responses (Rajaram & Geraci, 2000). To explain these inconsistencies with the earlier
explanation, Rajaram (1996, 1998) put forth a new framework that emphasized distinctiveness
and fluency instead of conceptual and perceptual processing. According to this framework,
processing distinctive or salient aspects of events increases remembering, whereas fluency or
ease of processing of events increases knowing, regardless of the conceptual or perceptual
aspects of the process. This framework successfully accounted for most findings regarding the
functional independence of the two retrieval experiences and will be used to discuss the results
of the three experiments reported below.

1.3 Methodological Issues in Remember/Know Research
Before considering the current project, it is worth mentioning several issues regarding the
use of the remember/know procedure. One issue is whether data from know responses are noisy,
8

because they might include guessing. To resolve this issue, Gardiner, Java and RichardsonKlavehn (1996) added a guess option to the procedure. This allowed participants to indicate if
they were merely guessing the occurrence of an event during study, when they recalled or
recognized it at test. As a result, guessing was eliminated from know responses without affecting
remember responses (Gardiner et al., 1996; Gardiner, Ramponi, & Richardson-Klavehn, 1998),
and this procedure became widely adopted. The guess option is included in the experiments in
this thesis as well, in order to obtain better estimates of remembering and knowing.
When using the remember/know procedure, it is crucial to make sure participants
understand the distinction between each response type. In a review of the methodological issues
in the remember/know paradigm, Migo, Mayes and Montaldi (2012) discussed the importance of
checking whether participants understood and actually followed the instructions regarding the
distinction between response types. They noted that majority of the studies using the
remember/know procedure did not mention whether or how they checked if participants
understood and followed the instructions. One suggestion they made is to ascertain how many
participants were replaced based on their understanding of instructions, and why they were
replaced. Typically, in remember/know studies, written and/or verbal instructions are provided to
participants. In some of these studies, participants are asked to repeat the instructions back to the
experimenter. In the experiments in this thesis, the experimenter gave verbal instructions to a
group of participants prior to the beginning of the experiment and asked one of the participants in
the group to explain the distinction between remembering, knowing and guessing in their own
words. In addition, participants were asked to explain how they distinguished between each
response type in a post-experimental questionnaire. These responses were used to identify
whether participants understood the instructions correctly and to replace the participants who did
9

not accurately explain the distinction between remembering, knowing and guessing (see
Eldridge, Sarfatti, & Knowlton, 2002, for a similar procedure). The main focus will be the data
from those participants who were able to describe the distinction between response types
correctly, and data from all of the participants will be reported in the appendices. As will be
discussed later, whether or not the participants were able to correctly describe the distinction did
not change the results.
Another issue with remember and know responses is their statistical analysis. When only
using remember and know options, these responses are dependent on each other (Rajaram,
1993). That is, for a fixed level of recall or recognition, as remember responses increase, know
responses must decrease (and vice versa). In the early days of remember/know research,
Gardiner (1988) compared these responses by including response type as a factor in an analysis
of variance (ANOVA), but he noted that this practice may be questionable since these are not
independent variables manipulated by the experimenter. Rajaram (1993) proposed a different
way of comparing remember and know responses. She calculated two proportions, one of
remember responses divided by the total number of recognition responses and the other of know
responses divided by the total number of recognition responses in each condition. She then
compared the remember proportions between two conditions using a paired comparison t test,
and did a separate t test for the know proportions. However, when there are more than two
conditions in an experiment, comparison of response type proportions across multiple conditions
requires an analysis of variance (ANOVA) instead of multiple t tests. In the experiments reported
below, remember, know, and guess responses will be compared across conditions using separate
ANOVAs for each response type following prior research (e.g., Dewhurst & Brandt, 2007;
Hamilton & Rajaram, 2003).
10

The proportion of each response type, however, can be calculated two different ways:
One way is to divide the number of each response type to the total number of items in a
particular condition. This way, the proportion of remember, know, and guess responses add up to
the proportion correctly recalled or recognized in that condition. These absolute or raw
proportions are not very informative when comparing each response type across conditions that
vary greatly in the level of recall or recognition, because they are dependent on accuracy in their
respective conditions. For instance, if recognition in Condition A is 0.3 and recognition in
Condition B is 0.7, the absolute proportion of a response type will almost always be lower in
Condition A than Condition B. In order to make a better comparison without being limited by the
level of recall or recognition, relative or conditional proportions can be used (Chan &
McDermott, 2006; Dewhurst & Conway, 1994; Rajaram, 1993). These proportions can be
obtained by dividing the number of each response type to the proportion correctly recalled or
recognized in a particular condition. This way, the proportion of remember, know, and guess
responses in a condition add up to one. These relative proportions, therefore, are more
informative when comparing response types across conditions that differ greatly in their
respective accuracy level. In this thesis, both proportions will be reported, but the main focus
will be on the relative proportions because recall varies widely across conditions.
When inferring how much recollection and familiarity contribute to recall or recognition
using remember and know responses, both ways of calculating response proportions assume that
remembering and knowing are mutually exclusive: Recollection is measured only through
remember responses, and familiarity only through know responses. Jacoby, Yonelinas and
Jennings (1997) argued against this assumption and stated that remember responses can be
provided based on both recollection and familiarity, instead of only recollection. This meant that
11

using only know responses underestimates familiarity, because some familiarity contributes to
remembering. Because this issue cannot be addressed using the typical ways of analyses
discussed above, Jacoby et al. introduced the Independence Remember/Know (IRK) procedure
that did not assume exclusivity between remember and know responses, but rather considered
familiarity to be contributing to both response types. In this procedure, recollection is measured
by the proportion of remember responses; however, familiarity is measured differently. Instead
of taking the proportion of know responses as a proxy of familiarity, familiarity is estimated by
the proportion of know responses for trials in which participants do not use the remember option.
This measure then reflects a group of familiarity-based responses where there was no
recollection, or Know/(1-Remember) in an equation form (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995).
Transforming know responses using this equation results in an estimate of familiarity
independent of recollection. One key point is that this estimate is derived from the absolute (or
raw) proportion of remember and know responses. Therefore, the absolute proportion of
remember responses (instead of the relative proportion) is the appropriate measure to consider
when comparing estimates of familiarity to recollection.

1.4 The Current Study
As previously noted, remembering and knowing are functionally independent. Which
one, then, is related to the increase in recall when the power of retrieval cues increases?
Although few studies addressed this question using recognition, evidence from recall
experiments is minimal (see Hamilton & Rajaram, 2003; Tulving, 1985). The aim of this thesis is
to more fully explore the relation of increasing the power of retrieval cues to retrieval experience
using word recall experiments.
Tulving (1976) stated that recall and recognition involve similar processes, with the
12

major difference between the two tasks being the cue information available during retrieval.
Tulving and Watkins (1973) showed that assuming recall and recognition are continuous yields a
more parsimonious account of retrieval, instead of assuming they are fundamentally different
tasks. As discussed above, participants in their experiment studied multiple lists of five-letter
words and were tested on the words with varying numbers of letters of the words as cues.
Participants either recalled with no letters (i.e., free recall), the first two letters, three letters, four
letters, or with all five letters of a word (recognition-like recall task). Recall gradually increased
as more letter cues were provided, suggesting that recall and recognition are not fundamentally
different, but they are continuous.
Further evidence showing that recall and recognition employ similar processes comes
from studies using the remember/know procedure in recall tasks. Although the number of studies
using this procedure in recognition is much higher, remember/know studies using recall has
consistently shown that knowing also contributes to accurate recall (Hamilton & Rajaram, 2003;
Lindsay & Kelley, 1996; McCabe, Roediger, & Karpicke, 2010; McDermott, 2006; Mickes,
Seale-Carlisle, & Wixted, 2013). For instance, McCabe et al. (2010) used inclusion and
exclusion tasks (see Jacoby, 1991 and Jacoby et al., 1997) and the remember/know paradigm to
assess automatic processes in free recall. The two methods showed converging evidence that free
recall does not only rely on conscious recollection or controlled processing, but that familiarity
or automatic processing is also involved. This finding is inconsistent with the claim by Quamme,
Yonelinas, Widaman, Kroll and Sauvé (2004) that recall only involves recollection, and
recognition involves both recollection and familiarity.
Given that recollection and familiarity both are processes involved in successful retrieval,
are they equally responsible when recall increases with the provision of more powerful retrieval
13

cues? Although a few studies asked similar questions using recognition tasks, the extent to which
remembering and knowing contribute to this increase in accuracy in recall tasks is unclear (but
see Hamilton & Rajaram, 2003; Tulving, 1985). Because recall and recognition employ similar
processes, there is no theoretical reason why this question cannot be asked in the context of
recall. In this thesis, I will examine whether the increase in recall via increasing the power of
retrieval cues is driven by remembering, knowing, or both.
According to the encoding specificity principle and the transfer-appropriate processing
framework, retrieval is enhanced when retrieval cues tap into the original encoding episode or
when retrieval conditions match those of encoding. Because some aspect of encoding is
reinstated at retrieval, recollection might increase. If so, participants should give more remember
responses when retrieval cues and/or conditions tap into those of encoding, while know
responses should not necessarily be affected. Previous research on remember and know
responses mentioned the possibility of this relationship in passing. For instance, Rajaram (1993)
argued that “‘remember’ responses, by definition, require recollecting the study phase and
reinstating its context” (p. 100). Similarly, Dewhurst and Conway (1994) stated that “when these
activated memories contain details of sensory and perceptual information, semantic information,
and records of cognitive operations performed at study, then recognition memory is dominated
by recollective experience” (p. 1098).
In fact, several studies have shown this pattern in word recognition experiments. Macken
(2002) manipulated the context in which participants studied items and then took a recognition
test, collecting remember and know responses for each recognized item. Context was defined as
a combination of color of the screen, color of the presented item and location of these on the
screen. Participants studied items in one of two contexts and were tested on those in either the
14

old context or a novel context (Experiment 1 and 2), or were tested in the two old contexts
(Experiment 3). As expected, matching the context in which items were studied and tested
increased recognition for both words (Experiment 1 and 3) and nonwords (Experiment 2).
Critically, the match in study and test contexts selectively increased remember responses, but did
not affect know responses. Macken (2002) concluded that context effects in recognition memory
occur only when recognition is accompanied by conscious recollection (i.e., remember
responses), but not when an item is recognized based on familiarity (i.e., know responses).
In a different study, Dewhurst and Brandt (2007) contrasted generation of five-letter
words from four-letter fragments and reading intact five-letter words at learning and at test, and
asked participants about their retrieval experience at test. Both experiments in their study
produced similar results. Generating words during study increased recognition of words
generated and read during test; more importantly, recognition memory was enhanced when the
same words were also generated at test. In both experiments, they asked participants to indicate
their retrieval experience during recognition by giving a remember, know or guess response after
each recognition judgment. Participants gave more remember responses when words generated
during study were also generated at test, but not when words read during study were also read at
test. Dewhurst and Brandt (2007) concluded that matching effortful encoding and retrieval
conditions (i.e., generation) enhanced recognition memory and was accompanied by a conscious
recollection of encoding (i.e., more remember responses), whereas matching more automatic
encoding and retrieval conditions (i.e., reading) did not show a similar pattern. Taken together,
these studies suggest that matching certain study and test conditions, therefore providing more
powerful retrieval cues at test, enhances recognition and that this is associated with an increase in
only remember responses.
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Yet several other studies have shown different or opposite effects. For instance, Tulving
(1985) showed that, when participants studied category instances they recalled more when they
were provided with the category name or the category name with the first letter of the instance,
compared to free recall of category instances. Critically, this increased recall was accompanied
by decreased proportions of remember responses. However, as Hamilton and Rajaram (2003)
noted, Tulving’s participants took three successive tests (free recall, category cued recall, and
then category plus first letter cued recall) and therefore the decrease in remember responses
could be due to passage of time, item selection or output interference. Hamilton and Rajaram
(2003) argued that with this design, remember and know responses in each of the three tasks
cannot be properly compared. In their first experiment, after studying category-exemplar pairs,
participants were assigned to a free recall, category cued recall, category plus first letter recall or
a recognition condition that were manipulated between participants. As expected, performance
increased when more powerful retrieval cues were provided; however, the relative proportion of
remember responses did not change. This suggests that increases in recall or recognition with the
provision of more powerful retrieval cues may not always be accompanied by increased
recollection.
In another study, Gregg and Gardiner (1994) showed that matching study and test
presentation modalities (visual and auditory) selectively increased know responses, leaving
remember responses unaffected. In Experiment 2, they presented words visually and rapidly to
half of the participants, who were not informed of a subsequent recognition test. These
participants were asked to count the number of words with blurred letters on the list (none of the
words were blurred). The remaining half of the participants were informed of a subsequent
recognition test and they studied the words at a slower presentation rate. Words were presented
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visually at study, and all participants took a recognition test in which half of the words were
presented visually and the remaining half were presented auditorily. Participants indicated
whether they remembered or knew the words they recognized at test. Gregg and Gardiner (1994)
found that the group that was asked to count the number of blurred letters on the list showed
higher recognition performance when the presentation modalities matched. Critically, this better
recognition performance was accompanied by increased know responses, suggesting that
reinstating some aspects of encoding at retrieval might selectively increase know responses
under certain circumstances.
The goal of this thesis is to focus on word recall experiments and investigate how
provision of more powerful retrieval cues relates to remembering and knowing. Previous studies
typically investigated retrieval experience when encoding and retrieval conditions match in
recognition memory, but of course remembering and knowing were originally intended to apply
to recall, too (e.g., Tulving, 1985). In the first two experiments, retrieval cues were matched or
mismatched with the study conditions using cued recall. These two experiments used semantic
and rhyme cues at study and test, similar to Fisher and Craik’s (1977) study. In the third
experiment, the power of retrieval cues was gradually increased by providing different numbers
of letters of words as cues, similar to Tulving and Watkins’ (1973) study, rather than matching
and mismatching study and test conditions, which allowed a comparison between free recall,
cued recall and recognition-like conditions. In contrast to the first two experiments, the third
experiment used lexical cues. In all three experiments, participants were asked to provide
remember, know and guess responses to each word they recalled. Recall, remembering and
knowing were then compared across conditions to see if providing more powerful retrieval cues
increased recall and if so, whether remembering, knowing or both drove this increase.
17

1.5 Experiments 1 and 2
In the first two experiments, participants studied words with associate or rhyme orienting
questions, and were tested with associate or rhyme cues, resulting in four within-subjects
conditions: associate at study-associate cue at test (AA), associate at study-rhyme cue at test
(AR), rhyme at study-associate cue at test (RA), rhyme at study-rhyme cue at test (RR). These
experiments were based on the study by Fisher and Craik (1977, Exp. 2) discussed earlier, with
the addition of asking participants to provide remember, know, or guess responses after each
word recalled. Replication of Fisher and Craik’s recall findings was expected, with recall
increasing when the cues at test match the cues at study (i.e., AA, RR) compared to when the
cues do not match (i.e., RA, AR). It was predicted that this increase in recall when the cues
match would be accompanied with increased remembering, but not knowing. When participants
study target words by judging whether they are associated with or rhyme with another word, they
may elaborate on the relationship between the target word and the cue word in the orienting
question, potentially resulting in distinctive processing of targets. Then, if participants are
provided with the same cue words at test (i.e., in match conditions) they may recall the target
word based on the distinctive processing during encoding, leading to increased remembering
according to the distinctiveness/fluency framework (Rajaram, 1996). Alternatively, providing a
similar sounding cue to the target word (i.e., rhyme cue) may increase fluency of processing,
increasing know responses, especially in the RR condition.
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Chapter 2: Experiment 1
2.1 Method
2.1.1 Participants
One hundred eleven Washington University undergraduates from the Psychology
Department’s subject pool participated in the experiment. The set sample size was 64 to double
the sample size in Fisher and Craik’s (1977, Exp. 2) study in order to increase power. Data from
the additional 47 participants were collected in order to get a final sample of 64 participants who
correctly explained the distinction between remembering and knowing. This exclusion criterion
will be discussed later, but it did not much change the results. Participants were tested in groups
of up to six and received either 1 course credit or $10 for their participation. The study was
approved by Washington University’s Institutional Review Board.

2.1.2 Materials
Eighty target words, their associates and rhymes, and words unrelated to them were
selected using Nelson, McEvoy and Schreiber’s norms (1998), the English Lexicon Project
database (Balota et al., 2007) and an online rhyme dictionary (http://rhymezone.com). All words
were four to ten letters long and had a minimum logarithmic frequency of 7 (identified via the
English Lexicon Project database, see Balota et al., 2007). The target words were selected with
the constraints that they had at least one associate with a minimum of 0.4 backward associative
strength, and they had at least one rhyme. The materials can be found in Appendix A.
The study phase was a random presentation of forty associate orienting questions (e.g., Is
the following word associated to argue?) and 40 rhyme orienting questions (e.g., Does the
following word rhyme with kite?), followed by a presentation of the target word (e.g., fight).
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For the distractor task between the study phase and the test phase, simple arithmetic
problems were presented for three seconds each, until seven minutes were completed. The
arithmetic problems were either a sum, subtraction, multiplication or division of two numbers
between zero and ten.
The test consisted of a random presentation of thirty associate cue words (e.g., argue, for
the target word fight) and 30 rhyme cue words (e.g., kite, for the target word fight). The cues
corresponded to only one of the target words from the study phase.
The instructions regarding remembering, knowing and guessing were based on Gardiner
et al. (1998). Exact instructions can be found in Appendix B.

2.1.3 Design
Three independent variables were manipulated within subjects. Participants studied half
of the 80 target words with associate orienting questions and studied the other half with rhyme
orienting questions. The answer to 60 of these questions was yes (congruent trials), and the
answer to the remaining 20 questions was no (incongruent trials). Participants were tested only
on the 60 target words from the congruent trials. The incongruent trials were used to keep
participants on task during the study phase. Thus, during the study phase, participants received
an associated word with half of the target words (e.g., sand – beach) and a rhyming word with
the remaining half of the target words (e.g., honey - money). At test, participants were provided
with a rhyme or an associate for each target word from the study phase. Thus, there were four
within-subjects conditions: associate at study-associate cue at test (AA), associate at study-rhyme
cue at test (AR), rhyme at study-associate cue at test (RA), rhyme at study-rhyme cue at test
(RR). AA and RR were match conditions, whereas AR and RA were mismatch conditions. All
variables were counterbalanced such that each target word was presented with each orienting
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question, was in a congruent or incongruent trial, and was tested with each test cue type an equal
number of times across participants. After detailed instructions, all participants were asked to
provide a remember, know, or guess response following each recall response. The dependent
variables were proportion recalled in the four conditions, and the proportions of remember, know
and guess responses in the four conditions.

2.1.4 Procedure
All participants were tested on the computers in the laboratory in groups of up to six. At
the beginning, the experimenter briefly outlined the experiment and read instructions regarding
how to provide remember, know, and guess responses. Participants were instructed to give a
remember response “if recall is accompanied by some recollective experience”, a know response
“if recall is accompanied by strong feelings of familiarity in the absence of any recollective
experience”, and a guess response when they “think it possible that the word was presented but
[they] are not sure that it was” (see Appendix B for the detailed instructions). The experimenter
then asked one of the participants to repeat the distinction between remembering, knowing and
guessing, to make sure all participants understood the instructions before they began the
experiment.1 The rest of the experiment was computerized, and relevant instructions and an
example were presented on the computer screen before the study phase and the test phase.
In the study phase, participants studied eighty target words, half with rhyme and the other
half with associate orienting questions. The orienting questions were mixed and randomized for
each participant. Participants were instructed to give yes or no responses to questions that were
presented on the screen by clicking one of two buttons on the screen. Each question was
1

The first thirty-four participants were not given verbal instructions prior to the experiment. Responses on the postexperimental questionnaire showed that 26 of these participants did not understand the instructions regarding how to
provide a remember, know, and guess response correctly. Verbal instructions were provided for the remaining
participants and the experimenter made sure participants understood the instructions correctly before they began the
experiment.
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presented for three seconds and was followed by the presentation of a target word for two
seconds. Each question asked whether the following target word rhymed with or was associated
to the word provided in the question. Participants clicked yes or no buttons on the screen after
they were presented with the question and the target word. Clicking yes or no was self-paced.
At the end of the study phase, participants solved simple arithmetic problems for seven
minutes. Each arithmetic problem was presented for three seconds until seven minutes were
completed.
The test phase followed the arithmetic problems. Before the test, participants were
provided with written instructions reminding them how to provide remember, know and guess
responses for each word they recalled. Participants were then presented with thirty associate cue
words and 30 rhyme cue words and they were instructed to type in a target word from the study
phase that the cue word reminded them of. Each cue word corresponded only to one of the target
words in the congruent trials from the study phase. Recalling the target words was self-paced.
After participants submitted each recall response, a screen with four buttons appeared.
Participants were instructed to click NO RECALL if they left the response box empty, and they
were instructed to pick between the REMEMBER, KNOW, and GUESS buttons if they
submitted a response. Providing this response was self-paced.
After the test phase, participants completed a computerized, self-paced questionnaire
regarding their experience during the experiment (see Appendix C). Among other questions, they
were asked how they distinguished between remember, know and guess responses. The
responses to this question were scored and were used to identify the participants who did not
explain the distinction between these responses correctly.
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At the end of the questionnaire, participants were debriefed and thanked for their
participation. The experiment lasted 32.6 minutes on average.

2.1.5 Scoring
Recall scoring was computerized. Answers from the post-experimental questionnaire
were scored to identify the participants who understood the distinction between remember, know
and guess responses correctly. If a participant did not put in a response or did not explain the
distinction correctly, they were given a score of 0. If participants explained how they
distinguished between these judgments correctly, they were given a score of 1. Two raters scored
all responses. Pearson’s r showed reasonable agreement between the raters (r = 0.81, p < 0.01).
The participants who were given a score of 0 were replaced until the set number of participants
(N = 64) was obtained.

2.2 Results
47 participants with a score of 0 on the post-experimental question regarding the
distinction between remember, know and guess responses were replaced until a sample of 64
participants with a score of 1 was obtained. This exclusion of participants did not change the
results and is discussed later. Two participants from this sample of 64 were excluded from the
analyses because they were not able correctly recall any of the target words. Therefore, results
reported below are based on 62 participants who were able to correctly explain the distinction
between remember, know and guess responses in the post-experimental questionnaire. All
omnibus tests of statistical significance used an alpha level of .05. Because many of the critical
comparisons required post hoc tests to determine the nature of interactions, an alpha level of .001
was used for these comparisons. Effect sizes are reported using partial eta-squared (p2).
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2.2.1 Recall
The proportion of words correctly recalled was calculated for each of the four withinsubjects conditions: associate at study-associate cue at test (AA), associate at study-rhyme cue at
test (AR), rhyme at study-associate cue at test (RA), rhyme at study-rhyme cue at test (RR).
Figure 1 shows the proportion recalled in each condition. When participants answered associate
orienting questions during study, they recalled more at test (M = 0.46, 95% CI [0.44, 0.47])
compared to when they answered rhyme orienting questions (M = 0.33, 95% CI [0.30, 0.37]),
F(1, 61) = 77.87, p2 = 0.56. This is another instance of the levels-of-processing effect (Craik &
Lockhart, 1972; Craik & Tulving, 1975). Likewise, participants recalled more with associate
words (M = 0.61, 95% CI [0.57, 0.64]) than they did with rhyme words at test (M = 0.18, 95% CI
[0.15, 0.21]), F(1, 61) = 283.52, p2 = 0.82. The interaction between orienting question and test
cue was also significant, F(1, 61) = 262, p2 = 0.81. Participants recalled more in the AA
condition (M = 0.88, 95% CI [0.85, 0.91]) compared to both the RA (M = 0.33, 95% CI [0.27,
0.40]) and the AR (M = 0.04, 95% CI [0.02, 0.05]) conditions (t(61) = 17.26 and t(61) = 53.35,
respectively). Participants also recalled more in the RR condition (M = 0.33, 95% CI [0.27,
0.39]) compared to the AR condition (t(61) = 10.68), but not compared to the RA condition.2
Although the predicted interaction was obtained between encoding and retrieval conditions, the
extremely low recall in the AR condition and the lack of a superiority of the RR condition over
the RA condition is not in line with the predictions. I will address this point further in the
discussion.

2

Recall results of the full sample did not differ from the results reported here. See Appendix D for the table
including individual means.
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Figure 1. Recall across the different conditions in Experiment 1. AA: Associate study-Associate
test; RA: Rhyme study-Associate test; AR: Associate study-Rhyme test; RR: Rhyme studyRhyme test. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

2.2.2 Remember, know, and guess responses
Absolute and relative proportions of remember, know and guess responses were
calculated for each of the four within-subjects conditions only using accurate recall responses.
As mentioned earlier, absolute proportions are the number of a response type divided by the total
possible responses in a condition, whereas relative proportions are the number of a response type
divided by the correct responses in a condition. When a participant does not correctly recall any
of the target words in a condition, the proportions cannot be calculated due to having zero in the
denominator. Therefore, in those cases, the proportions of remember, know and guess responses
were recoded as zero (see Chan & McDermott, 2006, for a similar procedure). There were 35
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such cases in the AR condition (due to the extremely low recall in this condition), six in the RA
condition and four in the RR condition.
I will report analyses on the relative proportions and then note if the analyses on the
absolute proportions differ. Figure 2 shows relative proportions of remember and know
responses across conditions. The relative proportion of remember responses showed a similar
pattern to the accurate recall responses. Participants gave more remember responses at test when
they answered associate orienting questions during study (M = 0.41, 95% CI [0.37, 0.45]),
compared to when they answered rhyme orienting questions (M = 0.34, 95% CI [0.28, 0.39]),
F(1, 61) = 9.76, p2 = 0.14. Likewise, participants also gave more remember responses at test
when they recalled with associate words (M = 0.44, 95% CI [0.40, 0.48]) than when they recalled
with rhyme words (M = 0.31, 95% CI [0.25, 0.37]), F(1, 61) = 21.46, p2 = 0.26. Critically the
interaction between orienting question and test cue was also significant, F(1, 61) = 367.63, p2 =
0.86. Participants gave more remember responses in the AA condition (M = 0.76, 95% CI [0.70,
0.81]) compared to the RA (M = 0.12, 95% CI [0.07, 0.18]) and AR (M = 0.07, 95% CI [0.01,
0.12]) conditions (t(61) = 20.38 and t(61) = 19.90, respectively). Participants also gave more
remember responses in the RR condition (M = 0.55, 95% CI [0.47, 0.64]) compared to the AR
and RA conditions (t(61) = 11.47 and t(61) = 9.41, respectively). These comparisons support the
prediction that the increased recall when encoding and retrieval conditions match would be
accompanied by increased remembering.
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Figure 2. Relative proportions of remember and know responses across the different conditions
in Experiment 1. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
Unlike remember responses, know responses were not affected by the orienting question
and test cue manipulations. Answering rhyme orienting questions during study led to more know
responses at test (M = 0.22, 95% CI [0.18, 0.27]) compared to answering associate orienting
questions during study (M = 0.17, 95% CI [0.11, 0.22]), F(1, 61) = 4.90, p2 = 0.07. Neither the
test cues nor the interaction between orienting questions and test cues significantly affected the
proportion of know responses. The prediction that knowing would be highest in the RR
condition, due to fluency in processing similar sounding words to target words at test, was not
supported. Overall, the lack of differences in the know proportions across conditions supports the
prediction that the increased recall when encoding and retrieval conditions match would not
much affect knowing. However, we might not have a good estimate of knowing in the AR
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condition because performance in that condition was at floor, thus no definitive conclusions can
be made yet.
Although only 17% of the accurate recall responses were guessed, guessing differed
across the four conditions. Participants guessed more when they had answered rhyme orienting
questions during study (M = 0.32, 95% CI [0.26, 0.38]) compared to when they answered
associate orienting questions (M = 0.11, 95% CI [0.06, 0.16]), F(1, 61) = 32.05, p2 = 0.34.
Guessing was also higher when recalling with an associate word (M = 0.30, 95% CI [0.25, 0.35])
as opposed to recalling with a rhyme word (M = 0.13, 95% CI [0.09, 0.18]), F(1, 61) = 25.17, p2
= 0.29. The interaction between orienting questions and test cue was also significant, F(1, 61) =
58.88, p2 = 0.49. Participants guessed more in the RA condition (M = 0.54, 95% CI [0.45,
0.64]) compared to the AA (M = 0.05, 95% CI [0.06, 0.13]) and RR (M = 0.10, 95% CI [0.06,
0.13]) conditions (t(61) = 9.96 and t(61) = 9.06, respectively). Participants in the AR condition
(M = 0.17, 95% CI [0.08, 0.26]) did not guess significantly more compared to the AA and RR
conditions (both ps > .001).3
The results on the analyses of the absolute proportions of remember and guess responses
did not differ from that of the analyses reported above. The only difference between the analyses
of absolute and relative proportions was in the know responses. Unlike the results reported
above, absolute proportions of know responses did not differ based on which orienting question
participants answered during study. However, the test cue participants were provided did affect
knowing, F(1, 61) = 45.96, p2 = 0.43. Participants reported more know responses when
3

Results based on the relative proportion of remember responses of the full sample did not differ from the results
reported here. Know responses in the full sample were significantly affected by the interaction between orienting
question and test cue: Knowing in the RR condition was significantly greater than knowing in the AR condition. The
main effects and interaction in guessing were similar in both samples; however, guessing in the AR condition was
significantly higher than guessing in the AA condition in the full sample. See Appendix D for the table including
individual means.
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recalling with associate words (M = 0.12, 95% CI [0.10, 0.14]) compared to recalling with rhyme
words (M = 0.05, 95% CI [0.04, 0.06]). In addition, the interaction between orienting question
and test cue was significant when looking at absolute proportions, F(1, 61) = 25.35, p2 = 0.29.
The absolute know proportions were greater in the AA condition (M = 0.17, 95% CI [0.13, 0.21])
compared to the RA (M = 0.07, 95% CI [0.05, 0.09]) and AR (M = 0.01, 95% CI [0.004, 0.02])
conditions (t(61) = 3.88 and t(61) = 7.54, respectively). The absolute proportion of know
responses was also greater in the RR condition (M = 0.09, 95% CI [0.06, 0.11]) compared to the
AR condition (t(61) = 5.54), but not the RA condition. 4 This interaction is likely driven by the
large recall (and therefore absolute proportion of knowing) difference between the AA and the
AR conditions. Because absolute proportions are bound by the level of recall in a condition, it is
not informative to use them in cases where recall differs dramatically across conditions. As this
is the case in the current experiment, conclusions will be made based on the analyses of relative
proportions.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the Independence Remember/Know (IRK) Procedure
is often used to obtain a better estimate of familiarity. According to Jacoby et al. (1997),
remember responses can be taken as a pure measure of recollection; however, taking only know
responses as a measure of familiarity underestimates it. Because some familiarity also
contributes to remembering under the independence assumption, Jacoby et al. introduced a new
calculation that corrected for this: K/(1-R). By dividing the absolute proportion of know
responses into the opportunities participants did not make a remember response, a better estimate
of familiarity can be obtained. Absolute proportions of know responses were used to calculate an
4

Results based on the absolute proportion of remember and guess responses of the full sample did not differ from
the results reported here. The only difference was in the absolute proportion of know responses. Know responses
were significantly affected by the orienting questions during study. See Appendix D for the table including
individual means.
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estimate of familiarity. Figure 3 shows the absolute proportion of remember responses together
with estimates of familiarity across conditions, to compare recollection and familiarity across
conditions. Analyses of these estimates showed that familiarity at test was higher when
participants answered associate orienting questions during study (M = 0.25, 95% CI [0.20,
0.29]), compared to when they answered rhyme orienting questions (M = 0.10, 95% CI [0.08,
0.12]), F(1, 61) = 45.06, p2 = 0.43. Likewise, familiarity was higher when recalling with
associate words (M = 0.28, 95% CI [0.24, 0.32]) compared to recalling with rhyme words (M =
0.06, 95% CI [0.05, 0.08]), F(1, 61) = 110.65, p2 = 0.65. The interaction between orienting
question and test cue significantly affected familiarity, F(1, 61) = 81.07, p2 = 0.57. Familiarity
in the AA condition (M = 0.48, 95% CI [0.40, 0.56]) was greater than in the RA (M = 0.08, 95%
CI [0.06, 0.11]) and AR (M = 0.01, 95% CI [0.004, 0.02]) conditions (t(61) = 8.53 and t(61) =
11.19, respectively). Familiarity in the RR condition (M = 0.11, 95% CI [0.08, 0.15]) was greater
compared to the AR condition (t(61) = 5.63), but not compared to the RA condition. Overall,
these results mirror that of accurate recall and remembering, though of course with lower
estimates.5 Considering the estimates of recollection (remember responses), and familiarity
(know responses transformed with the IRK procedure), the increased recall when encoding and
retrieval conditions match seems to be accompanied by both recollection and familiarity.

5

Familiarity estimates of the full sample did not differ from the results reported here. See Appendix D for the table
including individual means.
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Figure 3. Absolute proportions of remember responses together with estimates of familiarity
across the different conditions in Experiment 1. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

2.3 Discussion
This experiment investigated whether the increased recall when encoding and retrieval
conditions match is accompanied with increased remembering, knowing, or both. Recall was
highest for the associate at study-associate cue at test (AA) condition, followed by the rhyme at
study-rhyme cue at test (RR) and the rhyme at study-associate cue at test (RA) conditions, which
did not differ. Recall was lowest in the associate at study-rhyme cue at test (AR) condition.
Although there was an interaction between encoding and retrieval conditions, the recall results
did not exactly replicate Fisher and Craik’s (1977), because recall in the RA condition was not
lower than recall in the RR condition. We had expected recall in the matching conditions (AA
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and RR) would be greater than recall in both non-matching conditions (RA and AR). In addition,
recall in the AR condition was much lower than expected given Fisher and Craik’s results.
One possible reason for the differences in recall between the current study and Fisher and
Craik’s is the nature of the test cues. Participants in Experiment 1 were presented with a word
that either rhymed with or was associated to one of the words they studied (e.g., wing or crown,
for the word king); however, the test did not explicitly state whether each cue word was a rhyme
or an associate cue. This may have confused participants and they may have treated cues as
semantically related, resulting in a failure to replicate Fisher and Craik’s results. Experiment 2
was conducted to resolve this issue. Therefore, discussion of the results regarding remember,
know and guess responses will be deferred and those results will be discussed together with
those of Experiment 2.
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Chapter 3: Experiment 2
Experiment 2 had the same design, materials, and procedure of Experiment 1, except for
the test cues. To replicate Fisher and Craik’s (1977) procedure, test cues were disambiguated by
stating whether they were associate or rhyme cues (e.g., associated with crown, or rhymes with
wing, for the word king). Participants studied words with associate or rhyme orienting questions,
and were tested on these words with associate or rhyme cues, resulting in the same four withinparticipants conditions as in Experiment 1: associate at study-associate cue at test (AA),
associate at study-rhyme cue at test (AR), rhyme at study-associate cue at test (RA), rhyme at
study-rhyme cue at test (RR). Participants also provided a remember, know, and guess response
after each word they recalled. An interaction between encoding and retrieval conditions was
expected, whereby recall in the AA and the RR conditions was predicted to be greater than recall
in both the AR and the RA conditions. As in Experiment 1, it was predicted that the greater recall
in the match conditions (i.e., AA and RR) would be accompanied with increased remember, but
not know, responses. Again, obtaining the highest know responses in the RR condition due to
potential fluency of processing when recalling with a similar sounding cue was predicted.

3.1 Method
3.1.1 Participants
Ninety-two Washington University undergraduates from the Psychology Department’s
subject pool participated in the experiment. As in Experiment 1, the set sample size was 64,
which doubled the number of participants in Fisher and Craik’s study (1977, Exp. 2) to increase
power. Data from the additional 28 participants were collected to obtain a final sample of 64
participants who could correctly explain the distinction between remembering and knowing. As
in the first experiment, this exclusion criterion did not much change the results and will be
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discussed later. Participants were tested in groups of up to six and received either 1 course credit
or $10 for their participation. The study was approved by Washington University’s Institutional
Review Board.

3.1.2 Materials and Design
The materials and design of Experiment 2 was the same as Experiment 1, except for the
test cues. Instead of a random presentation of cue words at test (e.g., argue or kite, for the target
word fight), the test in Experiment 2 was a random presentation of cues whose nature was made
clearer by stating whether they were associate cues or rhyme cues (e.g., associated with argue or
rhymes with kite, for the target word fight). Specifically, cue words from Experiment 1 were
presented either with the phrase associated with in front of those that are semantically related to
target words, or with the phrase rhymes with in front of those that are phonetically related to
target words (see Appendix A for a list of the target words with their respective associates and
rhymes).

3.1.3 Procedure
The procedure of Experiment 2 was the same as Experiment 1. All participants in this
experiment were given an outline of the experiment and were read the instructions regarding how
to provide remember, know, and guess responses. One of the participants in each session was
asked to repeat the distinction between remembering, knowing and guessing, to check whether
participants understood the instructions before they began the experiment. The experiment lasted
34.6 minutes on average.

3.1.4 Scoring
Scoring was similar to Experiment 1. Recall scoring was computerized. Only one rater
scored the post-experimental questionnaire, because the two raters had shown good agreement in
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the first experiment. The participants who were given a score of 0 for their understanding of the
distinction between remember, know and guess judgments were replaced until the set number of
participants (N = 64) was obtained.

3.2 Results
28 participants with a score of 0 on the post-experimental question regarding the
distinction between remember, know and guess responses were replaced until a sample of 64
participants with a score of 1 was obtained. As in Experiment 1, this exclusion of participants did
not change the results and is discussed later. The results reported below are based on 64
participants who were able to correctly explain the distinction between remember, know and
guess responses in the post-experimental questionnaire. All omnibus tests of statistical
significance used an alpha level of .05. Because many of the critical comparisons required post
hoc tests to determine the nature of interactions, an alpha level of .001 was used for these
comparisons. Effect sizes are reported using partial eta-squared (p2).

3.2.1 Recall
The proportion of words correctly recalled was calculated for each of the four withinsubjects conditions: associate at study-associate cue at test (AA), associate at study-rhyme cue at
test (AR), rhyme at study-associate cue at test (RA), rhyme at study-rhyme cue at test (RR).
Figure 4 shows proportion recalled in each condition. Similar to the first experiment, answering
associate orienting questions during study led to greater recall (M = 0.57, 95% CI [0.54, 0.60])
compared to answering rhyme orienting questions (M = 0.49, 95% CI [0.45, 0.52]), F(1, 63) =
39.50, p2 = 0.39. In addition, recalling with associate cues increased recall (M = 0.70, 95% CI
[0.67, 0.73]) compared to recalling with rhyme cues (M = 0.36, 95% CI [0.32, 0.40]), F(1, 63) =
448.41, p2 = 0.88. The interaction between orienting question and test cue was also significant,
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F(1, 63) = 193.06, p2 = 0.75. Similar to the first experiment, participants recalled more in the
AA condition (M = 0.91, 95% CI [0.88, 0.93]) compared to both the RA (M = 0.49, 95% CI
[0.44, 0.54]) and the AR (M = 0.23, 95% CI [0.19, 0.28]) conditions (t(63) = 16.10 and t(63) =
26.52, respectively). Participants recalled more in the RR condition (M = 0.49, 95% CI [0.44,
0.54]) compared to the AR condition (t(63) = 8.73), but not compared to the RA condition.6
Overall recall was higher in this experiment, and performance in the AR condition was not at
floor. However, unlike what was predicted, recall in the RR condition was still not higher than
recall in the RA condition. I will consider this outcome in the discussion.

6

Recall results of the full sample did not differ from the results reported here. See Appendix E for the table
including individual means.
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Figure 4. Recall across the different conditions in Experiment 2. AA: Associate study-Associate
test; RA: Rhyme study-Associate test; AR: Associate study-Rhyme test; RR: Rhyme studyRhyme test. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

3.2.2 Remember, know, and guess responses
As in the previous experiment, absolute and relative proportions of remember, know and
guess responses were calculated for each of the four within-subjects conditions only using
accurate recall responses. Again, for the cases in which these proportions could not be calculated
due to having zero in the denominator, the proportions were recoded as zero. There were only
seven such cases, all in the AR condition.
Figure 5 shows the relative proportion of remember and know responses across
conditions. The relative proportion of remember responses was similar to that in the first
experiment. Answering associate orienting questions during study led to more remembering at
test (M = 0.48, 95% CI [0.43, 0.53]), compared to answering rhyme orienting questions (M =
0.36, 95% CI [0.30, 0.41]), F(1, 63) = 30.14, p2 = 0.32. Recalling with associate cues also led to
more remembering at test (M = 0.47, 95% CI [0.42, 0.51]) compared to recalling with rhyme
cues (M = 0.37, 95% CI [0.31, 0.43]), F(1, 63) = 21.66, p2 = 0.26. Again, the interaction
between orienting question and test cue was also significant, F(1, 63) = 185.35, p2 = 0.75.
Participants gave more remember responses in the AA condition (M = 0.76, 95% CI [0.71, 0.81])
compared to the RA (M = 0.17, 95% CI [0.11, 0.23]) and AR (M = 0.20, 95% CI [0.12, 0.27])
conditions (t(63) = 18.12 and t(63) = 13.70, respectively). Participants also gave more remember
responses in the RR condition (M = 0.54, 95% CI [0.47, 0.62]) compared to the AR and RA
conditions (t(63) = 7.11 and t(63) = 9.53, respectively). These results replicate those of the first
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experiment and further support the prediction that the increased recall when encoding and
retrieval conditions match would be accompanied by increased remembering.
Similar to the first experiment, know responses were not much affected by the encoding
and retrieval manipulations. Although the effect of orienting questions on knowing was
significant in the first experiment, the pattern only approached significance in this experiment,
F(1, 63) = 3.32, p = .07, p2 = 0.05. Answering rhyme orienting questions during study led to
slightly greater knowing at test (M = 0.26, 95% CI [0.22, 0.30]) compared to answering associate
orienting questions (M = 0.21, 95% CI [0.17, 0.26]). Neither the test cues nor the interaction
between orienting questions and test cues significantly affected the proportion of know
responses. These results further support the prediction that the increased recall when encoding
and retrieval conditions match does not much affect knowing.
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Figure 5. Relative proportions of remember and know responses across the different conditions
in Experiment 2. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
Guessing was similar to that in the first experiment. Participants guessed more when they
answered rhyme orienting questions during study (M = 0.36, 95% CI [0.31, 0.41]) compared to
when they answered associate orienting questions (M = 0.24, 95% CI [0.18, 0.29]), F(1, 63) =
17.43, p2 = 0.22. Unlike the first experiment, the kind of test cue did not significantly affect
guessing. The interaction between orienting questions and test cues was significant, F(1, 63) =
127.60, p2 = 0.67. As in the first experiment, participants guessed more in the RA condition (M
= 0.52, 95% CI [0.45, 0.59]) compared to the AA (M = 0.06, 95% CI [0.04, 0.09]) and RR (M =
0.20, 95% CI [0.14, 0.25]) conditions (t(63) = 13.64 and t(63) = 8.76, respectively). Participants
in the AR condition (M = 0.41, 95% CI [0.31, 0.51]) also gave more guess responses compared
to the RR and AR conditions (t(63) = 4.44 and t(63) = 7.33, respectively).7
The results on the analyses of the absolute proportions of remember responses did not
differ from the results reported above. The analyses of the absolute proportions of know
responses was different from that of relative proportions. Unlike the results reported above,
absolute proportions of know responses did not differ based on which orienting question
participants answered during study. However, test cue significantly affected knowing, F(1, 63) =
22.61, p2 = 0.26. Participants gave more know responses when they recalled with associate cues
(M = 0.15, 95% CI [0.12, 0.17]) compared to when they recalled with rhyme cues (M = 0.09,
95% CI [0.07, 0.11]). The interaction between orienting question and test cue was still nonsignificant. Absolute proportion of guess responses were similar to relative proportions, except
7

Results based on the relative proportion of remember and guess responses of the full sample did not differ from the
results reported here. The only difference was in the relative proportion of know responses. Know responses were
not affected by the orienting questions during study. See Appendix E for the table including individual means.
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test cue significantly affected guessing: Participants guessed more when they recalled with
associate cues (M = 0.14, 95% CI [0.12, 0.16]) compared to when they guessed with rhyme cues
(M = 0.08, 95% CI [0.07, 0.10]), F(1, 63) = 22.48, p2 = 0.26.8

Figure 6. Absolute proportions of remember responses together with estimates of familiarity
across the different conditions in Experiment 2. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
As in the previous experiment, an estimate of familiarity was calculated for each
condition using the IRK Procedure, where the absolute proportion of know responses was
divided by one minus the absolute proportion of remember responses. The results were similar to
that of the previous experiment. Figure 6 shows the absolute proportion of remember responses
together with estimates of familiarity across conditions. Answering associate orienting questions
8

Results based on the absolute proportion of remember and guess responses of the full sample did not differ from
the results reported here. The only difference was in the absolute proportion of know responses. The interaction
between orienting question and test cue was significant. See Appendix E for the tables including individual means.
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during study increased the estimates of familiarity at test (M = 0.29, 95% CI [0.24, 0.34]),
compared to when answering rhyme orienting questions (M = 0.17, 95% CI [0.14, 0.19]), F(1,
63) = 25.59, p2 = 0.29. Familiarity was also higher when recalling with associate cues (M =
0.33, 95% CI [0.28, 0.39]) compared to recalling with rhyme cues (M = 0.12, 95% CI [0.10,
0.14]), F(1, 63) = 70.76, p2 = 0.53. The interaction between orienting question and test cue was
significant as well, F(1, 63) = 82.34, p2 = 0.57. As in the first experiment, familiarity in the AA
condition (M = 0.51, 95% CI [0.42, 0.59]) was greater than in the RA (M = 0.16, 95% CI [0.12,
0.20]) and AR (M = 0.08, 95% CI [0.05, 0.10]) conditions (t(63) = 7.90 and t(63) = 10.51,
respectively). Familiarity in the RR condition (M = 0.17, 95% CI [0.13, 0.21]) was greater
compared to the AR condition (t(63) = 4.13), but not compared to the RA condition. Based on
these results, some familiarity seems to accompany the increased recall when encoding and
retrieval conditions match.9

3.3 Discussion
As in Experiment 1, we were interested in whether the increased recall when encoding
and retrieval conditions match is accompanied by increased remembering, knowing, or both. The
pattern of recall results was similar to the results of Experiment 1, although overall recall in this
experiment was higher. In addition, recall in the AR condition was not as low as the previous
experiment, suggesting that changing the test cues clearly helped the participants. In both
experiments, answering associate orienting questions during study increased recall compared to
answering rhyme orienting questions, replicating prior research on the levels-of-processing effect
(Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Craik & Tulving, 1975). Similarly, in both experiments, participants
recalled more target words with associate cues than with rhyme cues, suggesting that associate
9

Familiarity estimates of the full sample did not differ from the results reported here. See Appendix E for the table
including individual means.
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cues are more powerful regardless of learning conditions. There was also an interaction between
orienting questions and test cues in both experiments. However, we failed to completely replicate
Fisher and Craik’s (1977, Exp. 2) recall results in both experiments. Although recall in the AA
condition was higher than both the AR and RA conditions, recall in the RR condition was only
higher than the AR condition and was equivalent to the RA condition.
A major difference between the first two experiments and Fisher and Craik’s is the
material used, which may explain the difference in recall results. In Fisher and Craik’s second
experiment, the difference between recalling with associate cues and recalling with rhyme cues
(calculated by subtracting the marginal means) was equivalent to the difference between
studying with associate cues and studying with rhyme cues. In the experiments reported above,
however, the effect size of the superiority of associate cues over rhyme cues at test was larger
than the effect size of the superiority of associate orienting questions during study over rhyme
orienting questions. This suggests that the associate cues in the first two experiments were very
powerful, and may have led participants to guess the correct answer. This is further supported by
the finding in both of the experiments that the largest proportion of accurate guess responses was
given in the RA condition. If less powerful associate cues were used at test, recall in the RA
condition may have been lower, resulting in a replication of Fisher and Craik’s (1977, Exp. 2)
pattern of recall across conditions.
In both experiments, remember, know and guess results were similar to each other
despite the differences in the level of recall. Accurate remember responses generally mimicked
overall accurate responding. Participants remembered a word more often when they had studied
it with an associate orienting question than a rhyme orienting question, replicating previous
research showing that deeper levels of processing lead to more remember responses (Gardiner,
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1988). Participants also provided more remember responses when they recalled with an associate
cue compared to a rhyme cue. These results were consistent across the different ways of
measurement and across the two experiments. As predicted, participants gave significantly more
remember responses when encoding and retrieval conditions matched (AA and RR conditions)
compared to when they did not (AR and RA conditions). In a sense, Fisher and Craik (1977,
Experiment 2) was replicated, at least with accurate recall responses due to remembering. These
results suggest that encoding/retrieval interactions are accompanied by increased remembering.
This conclusion is further supported by examining the proportion of know responses. In both
experiments, relative know proportions were similar across conditions. In the first experiment,
answering rhyme orienting questions led to more knowing at test, and this effect was only
marginally significant in the second experiment. Absolute know proportions in both experiments
showed that participants gave more know responses when they recalled with an associate cue.
Since these proportions are bound by the level of recall in a condition, this difference in the
absolute proportion of know responses is likely due to the large recall difference between
recalling with associate and rhyme cues. Absolute proportion of know responses were affected
by the interaction between orienting questions and test cues in the first experiment; however, this
effect disappeared in the second experiment. As previously discussed, relative proportions are
considered more informative than absolute proportions when comparing response type across
conditions that differ greatly in recall. Hence, the results suggest that knowing does not
accompany encoding/retrieval interactions in recall.
In order to infer whether recollection and/or familiarity accompanied the
encoding/retrieval interactions in recall, one must consider remember responses and the
estimates of familiarity (know responses transformed using the IRK Procedure). In both
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experiments, estimates of familiarity showed a similar pattern to accurate recall in which there
was a large difference between the AA and AR conditions but no difference between the RA and
RR conditions. Although more recollection (as measured by the remember responses) typically
contributed to recall, some familiarity seems to contribute to the encoding/retrieval interactions
in recall as well.
A confound in Fisher and Craik’s (1977, Exp. 2) design is that participants in the match
conditions (AA and RR) were always given cue words they had seen in the study phase (i.e.,
intralist cues), whereas the participants in the mismatch conditions (RA and AR) were always
given novel words (i.e., extralist cues). Therefore, recalling with intralist cues may have
increased fluency of processing and may explain any increase in knowing and estimates of
familiarity in the first two experiments. Although Fisher and Craik later addressed this confound
(Exp. 3, 1977) and still showed an interaction between encoding and retrieval even when all test
cues were novel, whether this would change the extent to which remembering and knowing are
responsible awaits future research.
The guess option in the remember/know paradigm is thought to serve as a way to purify
know responses, so that participants’ guesses are not lumped into the know category (Gardiner et
al., 1996, 1998), and they are not of great interest to the issues at hand. However, both
experiments obtained differences in guess responses. Participants typically provided more guess
responses when they studied words with rhyme orienting questions and when they were tested
with associate cues. The proportions of guess responses also suggest that participants tended to
guess more when encoding and retrieval conditions did not match.
To sum up, the first two experiments matched encoding and retrieval conditions to
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increase the power of retrieval cues and to observe how this matching affected remembering and
knowing. Recall was generally greater when the test cues matched study conditions, but the lack
of superior recall in the RR condition compared to the RA condition resulted in a failure to
replicate Fisher and Craik’s results (1977). However, using remember responses as a measure of
episodic recollection, the interaction between encoding and retrieval was more pronounced and,
in a sense, replicated the results of Fisher and Craik (1977). In addition, when examining what
retrieval experience was responsible for this increase, results revealed that the increased recall
when encoding and retrieval conditions match was in general accompanied by recollection
(measured by remember responses) and some familiarity (measured by know responses
transformed with the IRK procedure).
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Chapter 4: Experiment 3
We consider a different manipulation in the next experiment. The third experiment was
based on Tulving and Watkins’ (1973) study discussed earlier, in which participants studied fiveletter words and recalled them with varying number of letter cues ranging from zero letters (i.e.,
free recall) to five letters (i.e., recognition). As expected, Tulving and Watkins showed that as
the power of retrieval cues gradually increased, recall also gradually increased. The third
experiment asked if this improvement in recall would be accompanied with increased
remembering, knowing, or both. Participants studied multiple five-letter word lists and were
tested after each list with different number of letters provided as cues. For all but one of the lists,
participants were given a mixture of the first two letters, first three letters, first four letters or all
five letters of the words as a cue. They were asked to type in a word they studied in the prior list
that the cue reminded them of. For one of the lists, participants were given no cues (i.e., free
recall), and they were asked to type as many words as they can recall from the list they just
studied. The response requirement across conditions was the same such that even when
participants were given all five letters of a word as a cue, their task was to type in the complete
word. On all the tests, participants provided a remember, know, or guess response after each
word they recalled.
We expected to replicate Tulving and Watkins’ recall findings, where recall increased
when more letters were provided as cues. Using a similar design, Tulving (1985) had shown
decreased remembering from free recall to cued recall. However, Hamilton and Rajaram (2003)
later showed that remembering stayed the same across free recall, cued recall and recognition
tests when the tests were not successive, as was the case in Tulving’s (1985) study. Based on
these findings, provision of more powerful retrieval cues that increase recall should not increase
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the rate of remembering, unlike the two experiments reported above. According to the
distinctiveness/fluency framework, remembering increases when distinctive or salient aspects of
events are processed during encoding (Rajaram, 1996). Since encoding conditions were not
manipulated in the third experiment and participants were only instructed to study words for a
subsequent test, remembering should not differ across conditions. In addition, the third
experiment used lexical cues (varying numbers of letter cues for each word) instead of associate
and rhyme cues used in the previous experiments, which might lead to different results. In fact,
the distinctiveness/fluency framework would predict increased knowing in the third experiment
due to increased fluency at test. After studying intact words, participants in the third experiment
may process test items more easily when they are presented intact (i.e., the 5 Letters condition)
as opposed to when the cues have fewer letters. In addition, recognition tests often show higher
levels of know responses compared to recall tests, therefore knowing in the recognition-like 5
Letters condition was expected to be the highest across the different cue conditions.

4.1 Method
4.1.1 Participants
Forty-seven Washington University undergraduates from the Psychology subject pool
participated in the experiment. The set sample size was 30 to increase the sample size in Tulving
and Watkins’ (1973) study (their sample size was 20) to increase power. As in the previous
experiments, data from the additional participants were collected in order to get a final sample of
30 participants who correctly explained the distinction between remembering and knowing. The
exclusion criterion did not change the results, and will be discussed later. Participants were tested
in groups of up to six and received either 1 course credit or $10 for their participation. The study
was approved by Washington University’s Institutional Review Board.
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4.1.2 Materials
Each study list contained twenty words. The lists were five-letter words with the
constraints that the words should have a minimum logarithmic frequency of 6 (identified via the
English Lexicon Project database, see Balota et al., 2007), no two words in a list should have the
same first two letters, and changing the last letter of each word should form another word (e.g.,
crust and crush). This constraint was intended to discourage participants from guessing a word
as more letters were provided as cues. Thus, altogether this procedure yielded two sets of five
lists that were counterbalanced across participants. There were 200 words in total, with a mean
logarithmic frequency of 8.92. The lists can be found in Appendix F.
Participants were given thirty arithmetic problems between each study and test list as a
distractor task. The arithmetic problems were either addition, subtraction, multiplication or
division of two numbers between zero and ten.
Except for the free recall, all tests were a randomized presentation of cues corresponding
to the words that were on the list participants had just studied. These cues were the first two, first
three, first four or all five letters of a word, equally distributed for the words in a corresponding
study list. The first letter alone was not used as a cue as there was more than one word on the
study lists that started with the same letter.
The instructions regarding remembering, knowing and guessing were same as the
previous experiments. Exact instructions can be found in Appendix G.

4.1.3 Design
Participants studied five word lists and were tested on each list after a brief delay. The
presentation order of the lists was fixed, but the presentation of words within each list was
randomized. Cue type was manipulated within-subjects on four lists such that all participants
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received the first two letters, first three letters, first four letters, or all five letters of the words as
retrieval cues an equal number of times across all tests. Following a fifth list, participants
engaged in free recall. Four levels of the cue type variable (2 Letters, 3 Letters, 4 Letters, and 5
Letters) were mixed within four test lists, and the remaining level of the variable (Free Recall)
was used for the remaining test list. The placement of the free recall list was counterbalanced;
across the five lists, free recall occurred in each position an equal number of times across
participants. Cue type was also counterbalanced, whereby all words were tested with each level
of the variable an equal number of times across participants. All participants were asked to
provide a remember, know, or guess response following each recall response. The dependent
variables were proportion recalled in each cue type condition, and the proportions of remember,
know and guess responses in each cue type condition.

4.1.4 Procedure
All participants were tested on the computers in a laboratory setting in groups of up to
six. At the beginning, the experimenter briefly outlined the experiment and read instructions
regarding how to provide remember, know, and guess responses. The experimenter then asked
one of the participants to repeat the distinction between remembering, knowing and guessing, to
reinforce the participants’ understanding of the instructions before they began the experiment.
The rest of the experiment was computerized and relevant instructions were presented before
each study and test list. Participants were provided with a practice study list of five words and a
corresponding practice test before the experiment began. The words on the practice test were
different from the material used in the experiment. The practice test was used to make sure
participants understood how to make a recall response (i.e., writing a complete word instead of
the completion based on a cue) and a remember, know or guess response.
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The words in each study list were presented one at a time for two seconds. After twenty
words were presented, participants solved arithmetic problems for two minutes. Each arithmetic
problem was presented and answered for three seconds until two minutes were completed. A test
list followed the arithmetic problems. Before each test list appeared, participants were again
provided with instructions regarding remembering, knowing and guessing. For four of the five
test lists, the test was cued recall, where participants were presented with a mixture of the first
two, three, four or all five letters of the words they just studied, resulting in five words per each
cue type. Participants were instructed to type in a complete word that the cue reminds them of
from the list they just studied. They were instructed to type in a word even when they were given
all five letters of a word as a cue. For one of the five test lists, participants were given a surprise
free recall test, where no letters were provided. Participants were instructed to type in all the
words they could recall from the list they just studied in any order they preferred. The response
requirement was the same in all five cue conditions, where participants were asked to type a
complete word. Participants were instructed to type the whole word even if they saw all five
letters as a cue and they were instructed against typing only the completion (e.g., ush when the
cue is cr). Recall was self-paced for all test lists.
In all test lists, after the participants submitted a recall response, a screen with four
buttons appeared. Participants were instructed to click NO RECALL if they left the response box
empty, and they were instructed to pick between the REMEMBER, KNOW, and GUESS buttons
if they submitted a response. Participants gave a remember, know, or guess response
immediately after each recall response, including free recall. Making a remember, know, guess,
or no recall response was self-paced.
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After participants studied and were tested on all five lists, they completed a
computerized, self-paced questionnaire regarding their experience during the experiment (see
Appendix C). Among other questions, they were asked how they distinguished between
remember, know and guess responses. The responses to this question were scored and
participants who did not explain the distinction between these responses correctly were not
included in further analyses.
At the end of the questionnaire, participants were debriefed and thanked for their
participation. The experiment lasted 41.5 minutes on average.

4.1.5 Scoring
Scoring was similar to the first two experiments. Responses where participants typed the
correct completion of a cue instead of the complete word were considered accurate. There were
very few such cases. As in Experiment 2, only one rater scored the post-experimental
questionnaire, because the two raters had shown good agreement in the first experiment. The
participants who were given a score of 0 for their understanding of the distinction between
remember, know and guess judgments were replaced until the set number of participants (N =
30) was obtained.

4.2 Results
Twelve participants with a score of 0 on the post-experimental question regarding the
distinction between remember, know and guess responses were replaced until a sample of 30
participants with a score of 1 was obtained. As in the previous experiments, this exclusion did
not change the results and is discussed later. The results reported below are based on a final
sample of 35 participants who were able to correctly explain the distinction between remember,
know and guess responses in the post-experimental questionnaire. Due to the high sign-up rate,
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data from five additional participants were included in the final sample, making the final sample
35 instead of 30. All tests of statistical significance used an alpha level of .05 unless otherwise
stated. If the sphericity assumption was violated, a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used.
Effect sizes are reported using partial eta-squared (p2).

4.2.1 Recall based on list order and set
Participants were presented the lists in a fixed order, where half the participants studied
the same five lists in the same order from Set A and the remaining half of the participants studied
the same five lists in the same order from Set B. Neither the order of the lists, nor the set from
which word lists were drawn significantly affected recall. Thus, data were collapsed across these
variables.

4.2.2 Remember, know, and guess responses
Proportion of words correctly recalled was calculated for each cue type. Figure 7 shows
that proportion recalled increased as the number of letter cues provided increased from 0.31
(95% CI [0.24, 0.39]) for free recall, to 0.32 (95% CI [0.26, 0.38]) for two-letter cues, to 0.56
(95% CI [0.50, 0.62]) for three-letter cues, to 0.79 (95% CI [0.74, 0.84]) for four-letter cues, and
to 0.95 (95% CI [0.90, 1]) for five-letter cues. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA showed
that cue type had a significant main effect on recall, F(3.22, 109.41) = 169.94, p2 = 0.83.
Pairwise comparisons using the Bonferroni correction confirmed that recall significantly
increased as more letters were provided as cues. Free recall and recall when the first two letters
were provided were not significantly different, but all remaining differences were significant.
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These results replicate Tulving and Watkins (1973), although the current experiment yielded
higher overall recall.10

Figure 7. Recall across the different conditions in Experiment 3. Error bars represent
95% confidence intervals.

4.2.3 Remember, know, and guess responses
Absolute and relative proportions of remember, know and guess responses were
calculated for each cue type condition using only accurate recall responses. As in previous
experiments, when absolute and relative proportions could not be calculated due to having zero
in the denominator, they were recoded as zero. There were six such cases in the free recall
condition and one in the 2-letter cue condition.

10

Recall results of the full sample did not differ from the results reported here. See Appendix H for the table
including individual means.
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I will first consider relative proportions and then discuss if the analyses on the absolute
proportions differed from relative proportions. Figure 8 shows relative proportion of remember
and know responses across the cue conditions. The relative proportion of remember responses
did not change based on cue type, F(2.49, 84.68) = 1.13. Remember responses were similar for
the first four cue type conditions (Free Recall, 2 Letters, 3 Letters, and 4 Letters), ranging from
0.68 to 0.71. The proportion of remember responses was lowest in the 5 Letters condition (M =
0.62, 95% CI [0.53, 0.71]), and it was only significantly lower than remember responses in the 4
Letters condition. The finding that remember responses roughly stay the same as more powerful
retrieval cues are provided (except for the drop in remembering from the 4 Letters condition to
the 5 Letters condition) replicates Hamilton and Rajaram’s (2003) findings.

Figure 8. Relative proportions of remember and know responses across the different conditions
in Experiment 3. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Although the main effect of cue type on the relative proportion of remember responses
was not significant, the relative proportion of know responses differed based on cue type, F(4,
136) = 9.62, p2 = 0.22. The proportion of know responses in the 5 Letters condition (M = 0.31,
95% CI [0.23, 0.39]) was higher than in the Free Recall (M = 0.09, 95% CI [0.03, 0.16]), 3
Letters (M = 0.19, 95% CI [0.12, 0.27]), and 4 Letters (M = 0.18, 95% CI [0.12, 0.25])
conditions, but was not different from that in the 2 Letters condition (M = 0.22, 95% CI [0.13,
0.30]). No other differences were significant. Thus, the gradual increase in recall when more
letter cues were provided was accompanied by increased knowing. However, the increase in
knowing did not exactly mimic the increase in recall levels, as knowing in the 2 Letters, 3 Letter
and 4 Letters conditions did not differ.
The relative proportion of guess responses also differed based on cue type, F(4, 136) =
3.18, p2 = 0.09. Pairwise comparisons using the Bonferroni corrections showed that none of the
differences between cue type conditions were significant. Participants guessed most in the 4
Letters (M = 0.11, 95% CI [0.06, 0.15]) and 3 Letters (M = 0.10, 95% CI [0.05, 0.15])
conditions, which were followed by the 5 Letters (M = 0.06, 95% CI [0.03, 0.09]), 2 Letters (M =
0.05, 95% CI [0.01, 0.09]) and Free Recall (M = 0.05, 95% CI [0.01, 0.09]) conditions.11
The results on the analyses of the absolute proportions of know and guess responses did
not differ from that of the analyses reported above. The only difference was in the analyses of the
absolute proportions of remember responses. These proportions were significantly affected by
cue type, F(3.03, 103.14) = 56.01, p2 = 0.62, unlike the results reported above. These
proportions mimicked accurate recall responses, where absolute proportion of remember
11

Results based on the relative proportion of remember and know responses of the full sample did not differ from
the results reported here. Guess responses did not significantly differ based on cue type, unlike the results reported
here. See Appendix H for the table including individual means.
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responses increased as more letters were provided cues. The difference between the Free Recall
(M = 0.27, 95% CI [0.20, 0.34]) and the 2 Letters (M = 0.24, 95% CI [0.18, 0.30]) conditions did
not differ. The highest absolute proportion of remember responses were given in the 5 Letters
condition (M = 0.60, 95% CI [0.51, 0.69]) and the 4 Letters condition (M = 0.58, 95% CI [0.49,
0.67]), followed by the 3 Letters condition (M = 0.41, 95% CI [0.33, 0.49]), which were followed
by the Free Recall and the 2 Letters conditions.12
Estimates of familiarity were obtained transforming the absolute proportion of know
responses using the IRK Procedure. Figure 9 shows the absolute proportion of remember
responses with the estimates of familiarity across the cue conditions. Estimates of familiarity
increased as more letter cues were provided, F(2.63, 89.50) = 67.26, p2 = 0.66. Familiarity was
highest in the 5 Letters condition (M = 0.69, 95% CI [0.57, 0.80]), followed by the 4 Letters
Condition (M = 0.32, 95% CI [0.21, 0.42]), followed by the 3 Letters condition (M = 0.16, 95%
CI [0.10, 0.22]), which was followed by the 2 Letters (M = 0.08, 95% CI [0.04, 0.11]) and Free
Recall (M = 0.04, 95% CI [0.01, 0.07]) conditions. Overall, these results mimic accurate recall.13
Considering the estimates of recollection (remember responses), and familiarity (know responses
transformed with the IRK procedure), the increased recall when more letter cues are provided
seems to be accompanied by increased familiarity, although recollection generally contributed
more across conditions.

12

Results based on the absolute proportion of remember, know and guess responses of the full sample did not differ
from the results reported here. See Appendix H for the table including individual means.
13
Familiarity estimates of the full sample did not differ from the results reported here. See Appendix H for the table
including individual means.
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Figure 9. Absolute proportion of remember responses together with estimates of
familiarity across the different conditions in Experiment 3. Error bars represent 95% confidence
intervals.

4.3 Discussion
The goal in this experiment was to investigate whether the increased recall as a function
of increased lexical retrieval cues is accompanied by increased remembering, knowing, or both.
We replicated Tulving and Watkins’ (1973) results, although overall recall in this experiment
was higher. This is likely due to differences in the number of words per list (20 in the current
experiment, 28 in theirs). Critically, participants recalled more when they received more letter
cues, supporting the claim that gradually increasing the power of retrieval cues (i.e., increasing
the number of letter cues provided at test from zero to five) increases recall.
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The main interest was whether the increase in recall would be accompanied by
remembering, knowing, or both. Both the absolute and relative proportions of know responses,
as well as the estimates of familiarity, showed that the increase was accompanied by knowing or
familiarity. The relative proportion of remember responses were similar across conditions;
however, the absolute proportion of remember responses increased as more letter cues were
provided. Since recall in each condition was significantly different from others (except for the
Free Recall and 2 Letters conditions), and since the absolute proportions are much affected by
recall levels, it seems more reasonable to consider relative proportions and conclude that
remember responses were not affected by the provision of more powerful lexical retrieval cues.
This is not surprising given the findings of Hamilton and Rajaram (2003, Experiment 1). Their
participants studied category names and instances, and recalled the category instances via free
recall, category recall, category and letter recall, or recognition, providing remember and know
responses after each recalled word. Recall gradually increased as participants received more
powerful retrieval cues; however, the proportion of accurate remember responses stayed the
same across conditions. Based on these results and the results of the current experiment, it
appears that increasing retrieval support by giving more letter cues does not affect remembering.
Instead, the increased recall when more powerful lexical cues are provided is accompanied with
increased knowing.
The results are also not surprising given how differently remembering and knowing are
thought to contribute to recall and recognition. Typically, recall is considered to be driven more
by recollection than familiarity, whereas recognition is considered a combination of recollection
and familiarity (Quamme et al., 2004). We compared relative remember and know proportions
between the condition akin to recognition (i.e., 5 Letters condition) and conditions akin to recall
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(i.e., Free Recall, 2 Letters, 3 Letters, and 4 Letters conditions) using paired sample t-tests. The
results showed that participants gave significantly more remember responses in the recall
conditions compared to the recognition condition (t(34) = 2.98, p < 0.01), and gave significantly
more know responses in the recognition condition compared to the recall condition (t(34) = 5.32,
p < 0.01). However, although there was more recollection and less familiarity in recall conditions
compared to the recognition condition, recall still was not solely driven by recollection. This
replicates earlier studies showing that some familiarity contributes to recall and that free recall is
not a pure measure of recollection (Hamilton & Rajaram, 2003; McCabe et al., 2010;
McDermott, 2006; Mickes et al., 2013).
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Chapter 5: General Discussion
The principal aim of this thesis was to investigate whether the increased recall with
increasingly powerful retrieval cues is accompanied by increased remembering, knowing, or
both. The remember/know procedure (Tulving, 1985) was used in two recall paradigms to
address this question. The first two experiments manipulated semantic and rhyme contexts using
cued recall, and the third experiment manipulated lexical cues employing conditions akin to free
recall, cued recall and recognition. Both when the power of retrieval cues was increased by
matching encoding and retrieval conditions (Experiments 1 and 2) and by gradually providing
more powerful cues (Experiment 3), participants recalled more. Although there was more
remembering in all three experiments compared to knowing, the increase in recall when the
power of retrieval cues increased was accompanied primarily by increased recollection and also
with some increased familiarity in the first two experiments with rhyme and semantic cues, and it
was accompanied only by increased familiarity in the third experiment with lexical cues.
I will now consider different theoretical frameworks to understand the results of the
current study. One primary distinction between theories regarding remember and know
judgments is whether these judgments require a single process or dual processes. I will first
discuss single process theories and why they likely do not explain the results of this study, and
then I will discuss different dual process theories to account for the results.

5.1 Single Process Theories
Single process theories assume that remember and know judgments do not tap into the
separate processes of recollection and familiarity, but that they reflect responding based on
different adopted criteria on a single continuum of memory signal or strength (Donaldson, 1996;
Dunn, 2004). This theory assumes the signal detection model in which remember and know
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judgments reflect different levels of confidence. The stronger the memory trace is, the more
confident participants will be, and they will provide a remember response. On the other hand, if
the memory trace is weaker, participants will be less confident and therefore give a know
response (Donaldson, 1996). Although this model can account for many findings in the existing
literature (Dunn, 2004), some studies have shown that remember and know judgments do not
directly map onto high versus low confidence responses (e.g., Gardiner & Java, 1990; Rajaram,
Hamilton, & Bolton, 2002).
The current study cannot test the single process theory of remembering and knowing due
to recall being used instead of recognition. False alarms and confidence judgments are critical to
the signal detection model; however, the current study did not use recognition tests or collect
confidence judgments. Although a definitive conclusion cannot be reached, the instructions
regarding remembering, knowing and guessing used in the study should suggest that
remembering and knowing are not high and low confidence judgments, respectively. Know
responses were defined as cases in which participants recall a word confidently without having
any recollective experience. In fact, the participants who explained the distinction between
remembering and knowing based on different levels of confidence were replaced. 22 of the 87
participants that were replaced were such cases, suggesting that these responses may be tied to
confidence. However, since the main analyses across the three experiments exclude these
participants, the single process theory cannot explain the findings.

5.2 Dual Process Theories
Dual process theories state that remember and know judgments tap into two separate
systems or processes. When Tulving (1985) introduced the remember/know paradigm, he
claimed that remembering tapped into episodic memory, whereas knowing tapped into semantic
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memory. The argument that knowing is related to semantic memory was controversial, as
researchers noted many times that recall or recognition of events encountered once recently does
not necessitate the use of semantic memory (Gardiner & Richardson-Klavehn, 2000). Research
after Tulving (1985) revised the knowing component of the memory systems theory, and stated
that knowing tapped into procedural memory instead of semantic memory (Gardiner & Parkin,
1990). At the time, most findings showed that perceptual manipulations selectively affected
knowing, and knowing was influenced by manipulations known to affect implicit memory
(Jacoby & Dallas, 1981) However, later studies by Rajaram (1996) showed that some perceptual
manipulations selectively affected remembering, undermining the procedural memory account of
know judgments.
In the experiments in this thesis, participants studied words once and were tested on them
once. In all three experiments, participants could have come up with an answer from semantic
memory that fit the given cue, but simply guessing should have led them to give a guess response
instead of a know response. In addition, the systems theories cannot account for the dissociation
obtained in the current study. It is difficult to rationalize why matching semantic and rhyme cues
would selectively increase remembering stemming from episodic memory, but why providing
more lexical cues would lead to more knowing stemming from semantic or procedural memory.
Overall, although the systems theories have greatly contributed to remember/know research, they
cannot explain the results of this study.
Other dual process theories suggest that remembering and knowing are related to the
processes of recollection and familiarity, respectively (Jacoby, 1991; Yonelinas, 2002). The
terms recollection and familiarity come from earlier research investigating a dual-process model
of recognition memory (Jacoby, 1991; Mandler, 1980) and have been used to discuss remember
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and know judgments. Within this framework, recollection and familiarity are considered to
contribute to remembering, whereas knowing occurs when there is familiarity in the absence of
recollection (Jacoby, 1991). Therefore, although remember responses can be taken as a proxy of
recollection, know responses underestimate the familiarity that contribute to successful retrieval.
The IRK procedure discussed previously solves this issue by assuming independence between
the responses (Jacoby et al., 1997). Therefore, these dual process theories suggest that
remembering and knowing can be used to observe recollection and estimates of familiarity.
There are several dual process signal detection models regarding recollection and
familiarity. For instance, Yonelinas (1994) suggested that recollection is a threshold, whereas
familiarity is a signal detection process. Based on this interpretation, familiarity assesses the
quantitative trace or signal strength, but recollection assesses the qualitative information about
what is recalled or recognized (Yonelinas, 1994, 2002). However, a different dual process signal
detection model by Wixted (2009) assumes that recollection and familiarity are two continuous
processes that become aggregated for an event to be recognized. This model suggests that
remembering and knowing are not process-pure (Jacoby, 1991), and that recollection and
familiarity both contribute to the two responses. These models rely on having recognition
memory experiments where confidence judgments are obtained, therefore the results of the
current study cannot address which model fits the data better. However, in general, the
dissociation between remembering and knowing obtained across the three experiments are
supportive of dual process explanations of remembering and knowing.
Dual process theories that consider remembering and knowing in the context of recall are
not entirely lacking. Mickes et al. (2013) were interested in the issue of what know responses
mean in the context of free recall, and argued that “Know judgments reflect the cue-dependent
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retrieval of item-only information (though from episodic memory, not semantic
memory)…Remember judgments reflect the retrieval of item plus associative information from
an episodic search set, whereas Know judgments reflect the retrieval of item plus little or no
associative information from that same episodic search set” (p. 334). Although source memory
was not assessed in the current study, responses on the post-experimental questionnaire support
the possibility that remembering in recall involves item and associative information and that
knowing involves only item information. For instance, one participant in Experiment 1 said “If I
remembered encoding the word with a story/experience/association, then that connection is
almost always what triggered me to recall the word and click ‘remember’, otherwise there were
some words that I know I saw but didn't remember how I encoded them”. Similarly, one
participant in Experiment 2 said “I said ‘remember’ if I could associate some song, thought
process, or memory with the word (during the 'study' phase, I was sure to make connections with
every word). I clicked ‘know’ if I happened to think of a word I remembered seeing, but could
not recall what my association had been”. Finally, one participant in Experiment 3 said “For
remember, I had a feeling, image or story connected to the word. Know was for when I knew the
word, but there was no real connection to it”. Not all participants gave such responses, but for
those who did, it is clear that remembering meant that participants remembered the word and
some other information surrounding the experience of studying that word, whereas knowing
meant that participants knew the word but did not recall anything else about studying it. As
Mickes et al. (2013) argue, know responses in recall might mean knowing that an event occurred
during the study phase without being able to recall any associative information.
The distinctiveness/fluency framework also considers remembering and knowing to be
tapping into dual processes. Specifically, distinctive or salient processing of events during study
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are associated with increased remembering, and fluency or ease of processing of events at test is
associated with increased knowing (Rajaram, 1996, 1998). Even though recall increased in all
experiments reported above as more powerful retrieval cues were provided, there was a
dissociation between remembering and knowing. Increasing the power of retrieval cues via
matching semantic and rhyme cues selectively increased remembering, whereas increasing the
power of retrieval cues via providing more lexical cues selectively increased knowing. The
distinctiveness/fluency framework is a viable account to explain the data. It is likely that
distinctive processing was induced in the first two experiments when participants were asked to
relate a target word to the cue word within the corresponding orienting question. Receiving the
same cue from study at test may have reminded participants of their distinctive processing of
targets, resulting in increased remembering. In the third experiment, only knowing accompanied
the increase in recall. The fluency or ease of processing a test item likely increased as more letter
cues were provided and processing was likely most fluent when all five letters of a word was
presented at test, resulting in increased knowing. In addition, in the third experiment, participants
studied words without any orienting questions or instructed strategy. The only instruction was to
learn the words for a later test, and unless participants employed a specific strategy to use
distinctive processing, the distinctiveness/fluency framework should not predict an increase in
remembering across the different cue conditions. Although, the experiments in this thesis were
not designed to test the distinctiveness/fluency framework, the framework is useful in
understanding why a dissociation between remembering and knowing was observed.

5.3 Remembering and Knowing in Recall Tasks
The theories of remember and know judgements, with few exceptions, typically are
developed using recognition memory experiments. However, the current study was based on
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various recall tasks. Although the first study to use the remember/know procedure used free
recall, cued recall and recognition (Tulving, 1985), the procedure has been used mostly in
recognition memory experiments since then. Yet, there is a small number of studies that
investigated remembering and knowing in free recall or cued recall tasks (e.g., Hamilton &
Rajaram, 2003; Lindsay & Kelley, 1996; McCabe et al., 2010; McDermott, 2006; Mickes et al.,
2013). These studies have shown that remembering accounts for most of accurate recall;
however, some knowing contributes to accurate recall as well. Even though free recall is
sometimes considered a pure measure of recollection, the use of the remember/know procedure
revealed that some familiarity is involved in recall tasks (Mickes et al., 2013). This is further
supported in the data reported in this thesis. Although remembering was the most commonly
reported retrieval experience and contributed to 60% of accurate recall responses on average
across the three experiments, knowing contributed to 22% of all accurate recall responses. These
results, along with those of others who used the remember/know procedure in recall tasks,
suggest that both remembering and knowing lead to correct recall.

5.4 Instructions Regarding Remembering and Knowing
In all three experiments, a post-experimental questionnaire was used to identify the
participants who did not understand the remember, know, and guess instructions correctly. To
our surprise, although participants were given both written and verbal instructions and one
participant in each group was asked to explain the instructions to the experimenter, 35% of all
the participants in the current study did not correctly explain the distinction on the postexperimental questionnaire. Geraci, McCabe and Guillory (2009) noted that, based on their posttest questionnaire, about 20% of their participants did not understand their instructions. We used
a conservative criterion and excluded these participants from the main analyses. Any differences
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in the results when all participants are included in the analyses are reported in the footnotes, but
the results were similar to the main results in general. This lack of a difference suggests that
participants may be using each response as instructed during the experiment, but that the
distinction between remembering, knowing and guessing may not be easily verbalizable for
participants.
Prior researchers have noted the difficulty of using the remember/know procedure.
Regarding remember/know studies, Migo et al. (2012) stated that “the methods should matter as
much as the theory” (p. 1451). Similarly, Geraci et al. (2009) noted the great variability in the
remember/know instructions provided across labs. According to Geraci et al., some researchers
instruct participants to provide a remember response when they can remember contextual details
and to provide a know response when they cannot. Some instructions relate know responses to a
sense of familiarity, and some instructions associate them with high confidence in the absence of
contextual details. In two experiments, Geraci et al. (2009) showed that simply using different
instructions (i.e., whether remembering and knowing are related to high confidence or whether
only remembering is related to high confidence) can change the degree of remembering and
knowing. Because the use of remembering and knowing in everyday life do not exactly map onto
their meaning within the remember/know procedure, participants are typically given extensive
instructions on how to provide these responses. For instance, participants are given written and
verbal instructions, and are also asked to explain what the distinction is before they begin making
these judgements. In some cases, researchers pick a few of each participants’ responses and ask
them to explain why they remembered or knew that particular response (e.g., Gardiner,
Richardson-Klavehn, & Ramponi, 1997). In order to avoid confusions, McCabe and Geraci
(2009) used the terms Type A memory and Type B memory to refer to remembering and
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knowing, and showed that participants made fewer remember false alarms and therefore had
higher overall accuracy when remembering and knowing were introduced as neutral terms.
Although these kinds of control are necessary, it appears that asking participants to explain how
they distinguished between these responses as in the current study does not necessarily indicate
whether they provided these responses as instructed. Across the three experiments, we arrived at
similar conclusions when including or excluding those participants who could not explain the
distinction between remembering, knowing and guessing correctly.

5.5 Conclusion
This thesis investigated how retrieval experience changes when participants receive more
powerful retrieval cues to enhance recall. In the first two experiments, recall was enhanced by
matching encoding and retrieval conditions using semantic and phonetic cues. This is in line with
the encoding specificity principle and the transfer-appropriate processing framework. Critically,
the increase in Experiments 1 and 2 was primarily driven by remembering. In the third
experiment, recall was enhanced by increasing the strength of lexical cues, replicating Tulving
and Watkins (1973). However, this increase was primarily driven by knowing. These findings
suggest that successful retrieval can be achieved through either remembering or knowing, further
supporting the functional independence of these two subjective states of awareness.
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Appendix A
Materials for Experiments 1 and 2
TARGET
ALONE
ANSWER
ARMOR
BACK
BALL
BEACH
BELT
BIRD
BLOOD
BOAT
BOOK
BRUSH
CHAIR
CHILD
CHOICE
CITY
CLOSE
COUCH
DEATH
DEVIL
DIRTY
DREAM
DRUNK
EARTH
EGGS
FAST
FIGHT
FIND
FLOWER
FOREVER
FORGET
FORK
FRIEND
GHOST
GIVE

ASSOCIATE
ISOLATED
QUESTION
KNIGHT
FRONT
BOUNCE
SAND
BUCKLE
PARROT
DONOR
SAIL
PAGE
COMB
TABLE
ADULT
OPTION
TOWN
SHUT
SOFA
FUNERAL
DEMON
CLEAN
FANTASY
SOBER
PLANET
BACON
QUICK
ARGUE
SEEK
BLOOM
INFINITY
FORGIVE
SPOON
BUDDY
PHANTOM
TAKE

RHYME
STONE
DANCER
FARMER
RACK
WALL
PEACH
MELT
WORD
FLOOD
VOTE
COOK
FLUSH
BEAR
WILD
VOICE
PITY
DOSE
CROUCH
BREATH
LEVEL
THIRTY
CREAM
TRUNK
WORTH
LEGS
PAST
KITE
KIND
HOUR
CLEVER
SWEAT
CORK
ATTEND
POST
LIVE
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UNRELATED
POOL
THIEF
TIME
ROSE
LIGHT
CHURCH
MOVIE
JUDGE
PHONE
DEER
PURSE
SPEED
SALAD
EXIT
LION
POTATO
JUICE
RING
SOAP
SLEEVE
ZIPPER
COIN
QUEEN
WIFE
DRAWER
CHEESE
NOVEL
PALE
TOOL
GLOVE
NOUN
ARTICLE
TUBE
SOCK
MOUSE

GOLD
SILVER
MOLD
GRAPE
VINE
SHAPE
GRASS
WEED
BRASS
GUESS
ESTIMATE
LESS
HAMMER
NAIL
GRAMMAR
HARD
SOFT
YARD
HATE
DISLIKE
WEIGHT
HORSE
PONY
SOURCE
IDEA
CONCEPT
DIARRHEA
JAIL
PRISON
TAIL
KING
CROWN
WING
LAUGH
JOKE
GRAPH
LETTER
ENVELOPE
BETTER
MATH
EQUATION
BATH
MIDDLE
CENTER
RIDDLE
MILK
DAIRY
SILK
MONEY
BANK
HONEY
MOUNTAIN
HILL
FOUNTAIN
PAIN
HURT
LANE
PLACE
LOCATION
GRACE
POLICE
OFFICER
RELEASE
PRESENT
GIFT
PEASANT
PUSH
SHOVE
BUSH
RABBIT
HARE
HABIT
RICH
POOR
WITCH
SAME
SIMILAR
FAME
SHIRT
BLOUSE
ALERT
SHORT
TALL
COURT
SICK
ILLNESS
BRICK
SLEEP
TIRED
CHEAP
SLOW
SNAIL
BLOW
SMART
WISE
CART
SMELL
ODOR
BELL
SMOKE
CIGARETTE
CLOAK
SNAKE
SERPENT
LAKE
SONG
MELODY
WRONG
SWEET
SUGAR
RECEIPT
TALK
SPEAK
WALK
TEACHER INSTRUCTOR FEATURE
TEST
EXAM
WEST
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STREET
SHUTTLE
DEBATE
NAVY
SPICE
COFFEE
SPINE
CHALK
BEARD
JACKET
SAUCE
BONE
NURSE
DRUG
DOOR
EXPLODE
OCEAN
MUSTARD
SPEND
BUTLER
NEAT
ORANGE
DIAMOND
PERFUME
BAND
PENCIL
CLIMB
SEARCH
DOZEN
DOLPHIN
SOIL
FRAME
ALTER
CAKE
BUTTER
DOCTOR
ROCK
WINNER
LUNCH
LORD

TREE
TRIP
UNDER
WAITER
WORK

FOREST
JOURNEY
OVER
SERVER
LABOR

KNEE
GRIP
WONDER
SKATER
JERK
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RECALL
CLOCK
FIRST
LOVE
FISH

Appendix B
Instructions for Experiments 1 and 2
In the study phase, you will answer YES/NO questions about target words. Each question
is followed by a target word presented in the middle of the screen in capital letters. Pay close
attention to each question and make sure your answer is correct. You will take a test on the target
words presented in capital letters, so try to learn each word in addition to making the YES/NO
response.
In the test phase, you will see a cue on the screen. Your task is to type in a target word
from the study phase that the cue reminds you. You should then click SUBMIT. After you
submit your response, you will see a screen with four buttons. These buttons will be
REMEMBER, KNOW, GUESS, and NO RECALL, respectively. You should select one of these
buttons that describes your recall response the best. Here is how we want you to distinguish
between these judgments.
Memory is associated with two different kinds of awareness. Often, recall brings back to
mind something you recollect about what it is that you recall. For example, you recognize a face,
and remember talking to this person at a party the previous night. At other times recall brings
nothing back to mind about what it is you recall. For example, you are confident that you
recognize someone, and you know you recognize them, because of strong feelings of familiarity,
but you have no recollection of seeing this person before. You do not remember anything about
them.
The same kinds of awareness are associated with recalling the words you will see during
the study phase. Sometimes when you recall a word, this will bring back to mind something you
remember thinking about when the word appeared in the study phase. You will recollect
something you consciously experienced at that time. But sometimes recalling a word won’t bring
back to mind anything you remember about seeing it in the study phase. Instead, the word will
seem familiar, you’ll feel confident it was one you saw in the experiment, even though you won’t
recollect anything you experienced when you saw it in the study phase. For each word that you
recall, please then click the REMEMBER button if recall is accompanied by some recollective
experience, or the KNOW button if recall is accompanied by strong feelings of familiarity in the
absence of any recollective experience.
If the word you recall triggers something you experienced when you saw it in the study
phase, for example, something about its appearance on the screen, or the order in which the word
came in, please indicate this kind of recall by clicking the REMEMBER button. The word you
recall may also remind you of something you thought about when you saw it in the study phase,
for example, an association you made to the word, the question the word was paired with, an
image you formed when you saw the word, or something of personal significance that you
associated with the word. If you can recollect any of these aspects when you recall the word,
please click the REMEMBER button.
Instead, at other times, you will recall a word, but the word will not bring back to mind
anything you remember about seeing it in the study phase, the word will just seem extremely
familiar. When you feel confident that you saw the word in the study phase, even though you do
not recollect anything you experienced when you saw it, please indicate this kind of recall by
clicking the KNOW button.
There will also be times when you won’t remember the word, nor will it seem familiar,
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but you might want to guess that it was one of the words you saw in the study phase. Feel free to
do this, but if your recall response is really just a guess, please then click the GUESS button.
With a guess response, you think it possible that the word was presented but you are not sure that
it was. For example, some people say that the word looks like a word that could have possibly
been there. When you think your response is really just a guess, please click the GUESS button.
Finally, if you are unable to recall the target word, please click the NO RECALL button
in the following screen. In other words, you should click NO RECALL if you were not able to
type in a response in the immediately preceding trial.
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Appendix C
Post-Experimental Questionnaire
1. At test, what led you to give a remember, know or a guess response? How did you distinguish
between the three responses?
2. Did you find the instructions regarding remember, know and guess responses confusing? If so,
in what way?
3. Did you find the test difficult? If so, in what way?
4. Did you experience any problems during the experiment? Please explain if your answer is yes.
5. Were you doing anything else while the experiment was going on? (Your compensation does
not depend on your answer.)
6. Have you participated in this experiment before?
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Appendix D
Additional Results from Experiment 1
Recall, Remember, Know and Guess Proportions and Estimates of Familiarity in Experiment 1
for the full sample (N = 108).
Associate Test
Study

Associate (AA)

Rhyme (RA)

Associate (AR)

Rhyme (RR)

.88 (.12)

.37 (.24)

.06 (.08)

.32 (.21)

Remember

.73 (.25)

.13 (.21)

.05 (.19)

.54 (.34)

Know

.22 (.23)

.17 (.22)

.12 (.30)

.26 (.26)

Guess

.05 (.07)

.52 (.37)

.24 (.41)

.11 (.19)

Remember

.65 (.25)

.07 (.12)

.01 (.02)

.19 (.17)

Know

.19 (.20)

.07 (.10)

.01 (.04)

.09 (.11)

Guess

.04 (.06)

.18 (.16)

.03 (.05)

.04 (.06)

.48 (.34)

.09 (.13)

.01 (.04)

.12 (.14)

Recall

Relative
Proportions

Absolute
Proportions

Familiarity

Rhyme Test

Note. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. AA: Associate study-Associate test; RA:
Rhyme study-Associate test; AR: Associate study-Rhyme test; RR: Rhyme study-Rhyme test.
Familiarity refers to the know proportions transformed with the IRK procedure.
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Appendix E
Additional Results from Experiment 2
Recall, Remember, Know and Guess Proportions and Estimates of Familiarity in Experiment 2
for the full sample (N = 92).
Associate Test
Study

Associate (AA)

Rhyme (RA)

Associate (AR)

Rhyme (RR)

.90 (.12)

.47 (.20)

.21 (.17)

.47 (.20)

Remember

.73 (.23)

.14 (.21)

.18 (.29)

.52 (.29)

Know

.19 (.18)

.23 (.24)

.22 (.30)

.24 (.23)

Guess

.08 (.12)

.58 (.30)

.42 (.39)

.23 (.24)

Remember

.67 (.25)

.08 (.15)

.06 (.12)

.28 (.22)

Know

.16 (.15)

.12 (.13)

.06 (.08)

.11 (.10)

Guess

.07 (.09)

.24 (.15)

.09 (.09)

.09 (.08)

.46 (.35)

.14 (.15)

.07 (.09)

.16 (.14)

Recall

Relative
Proportions

Absolute
Proportions

Familiarity

Rhyme Test

Note. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. AA: Associate study-Associate test; RA:
Rhyme study-Associate test; AR: Associate study-Rhyme test; RR: Rhyme study-Rhyme test.
Familiarity refers to the know proportions transformed with the IRK procedure.
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Appendix F
Study Lists for Experiment 3

ALLOY
AWARE
BLOOM
BRAID
CHAIR
CLEAR
CRANE
FLOOR
GRAIL
HEARD
LINEN
PHONE
PRONE
SCALE
SHORT
SEVER
SPEAR
START
SWEAT
TRUCE

ALLOW
AWARD
BLOOD
BRAIN
CHAIN
CLEAN
CRANK
FLOOD
GRAIN
HEART
LINER
PHONY
PRONG
SCALP

ALONE
BASIL
BOWEL
BRAVE
CHARM
CLASH
DEBUG
FORTE
GRAND
IDIOM
MEDIA
PLAIN
QUART
REACH
SCARE
SHARK
SLANG
SPOOL
STEEL
TRACE

ALONG
BASIC
BOWED
BRAVO
CHART
CLASS
DEBUT
FORTY
GRANT
IDIOT
MEDIC
PLAID
QUARK
REACT

Set A
ANGEL
BELLE
BOXER
BRING
CHEAP
CREEP
DREAD
GRAPE
GUILT
LATER
MOUND
PLANE
QUEEN
RELAX
SHEET
SLICE
SPORT
STORY
SWORE
TRAIL
Set B
ANGER
BELLY
BOXED
BRINE
CHEAT
CREEK
DREAM
GRAPH
GUILD
LATEX
MOUNT
PLANT
QUEER
RELAY
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APPLY
BLANK
BREAK
CANOE
CHEER
CROWD
FLASK
GRASS
GUESS
LEASH
PASTA
PRICK
QUILL
SCENT
SHELL
SLEEP
SQUAD
STRAW
THING
TREAT

AUDIT
BLIND
BROOM
CHEST
COLOR
CRUST
FLING
GREEN
LEVER
PEACH
QUOTE
ROUGH
SCORN
SHOOK
SPARE
STEAM
SWEET
THREW
TOWER
TRIAL

APPLE
BLAND
BREAD
CANON
CHEEK
CROWN
FLASH
GRASP
GUEST
LEASE
PASTE
PRICE
QUILT
SCENE

AUDIO
BLINK
BROOK
CHESS
COLON
CRUSH
FLINT
GREED
LEVEL
PEACE
QUOTA
ROUGE
SCORE
SHOOT

SHORE
SEVEN
SPEAK
STARK
SWEAR
TRUCK

SCARF
SHARP
SLANT
SPOON
STEER
TRACK

SHEEP
SLICK
SPORE
STORE
SWORD
TRAIN
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SHELF
SLEEK
SQUAT
STRAP
THINK
TREAD

SPARK
STEAK
SWEEP
THREE
TOWEL
TRIAD

Appendix G
Instructions for Experiment 3
In this experiment, you will study words and you will be tested on them. There will be
five different word lists, each containing twenty words. You will be tested on each list
immediately after studying it. In the study phase, the words will be presented to you one at a time
in the middle of the screen for two seconds. In the test phase, you will receive a total of twenty
clues, each corresponding to a word on the immediately preceding list. Your task is to type in the
word that the clue reminds you of from the study list. In the test phase, after you submit a
response, you will also be asked to click one of three buttons (REMEMBER, KNOW, or
GUESS), regarding your experience recalling each word you will type in. Click NO RECALL if
you leave the response box empty. Click REMEMBER, KNOW, or GUESS if you typed in a
word. Here is how we want you to distinguish between these judgments.
Memory is associated with two different kinds of awareness. Often, recall brings back to
mind something you recollect about what it is that you recall. For example, you recognize a face,
and remember talking to this person at a party the previous night. At other times recall brings
nothing back to mind about what it is you recall. For example, you are confident that you
recognize someone, and you know you recognize them, because of strong feelings of familiarity,
but you have no recollection of seeing this person before. You do not remember anything about
them.
The same kinds of awareness are associated with recalling the words you will see during
the study phase. Sometimes when you recall a word, this will bring back to mind something you
remember thinking about when the word appeared in the study phase. You will recollect
something you consciously experienced at that time. But sometimes recalling a word won’t bring
back to mind anything you remember about seeing it in the study phase. Instead, the word will
seem familiar, you’ll feel confident it was one you saw in the experiment, even though you won’t
recollect anything you experienced when you saw it in the study phase. For each word that you
recall, please then click the REMEMBER button if recall is accompanied by some recollective
experience, or the KNOW button if recall is accompanied by strong feelings of familiarity in the
absence of any recollective experience.
If the word you recall triggers something you experienced when you saw it in the study
phase, for example, something about its appearance on the screen, or the order in which the word
came in, please indicate this kind of recall by clicking the REMEMBER button. The word you
recall may also remind you of something you thought about when you saw it in the study phase,
for example, an association you made to the word, an image you formed when you saw the word,
or something of personal significance that you associated with the word. If you can recollect any
of these aspects when you recall the word, please click the REMEMBER button.
Instead, at other times, you will recall a word, but the word will not bring back to mind
anything you remember about seeing it in the study phase, the word will just seem extremely
familiar. When you feel confident that you saw the word in the study phase, even though you do
not recollect anything you experienced when you saw it, please indicate this kind of recall by
clicking the KNOW button.
There will also be times when you won’t remember the word, nor will it seem familiar,
but you might want to guess that it was one of the words you saw in the study phase. Feel free to
do this, but if your recall response is really just a guess, please then click the GUESS button.
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With a guess response, you think it possible that the word was presented but you are not sure that
it was. When you think your response is really just a guess, please click the GUESS button.
Finally, if you are unable to recall a word, please click the NO RECALL button in the
following screen. In other words, you should click NO RECALL if you were not able to type in a
response in the immediately preceding trial.
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Appendix H
Additional Results from Experiment 3
Recall, Remember, Know and Guess Proportions and Estimates of Familiarity in Experiment 3
for the full sample (N = 47)
Free Recall

2 Letters

3 Letters

4 Letters

5 Letters

_____

CR___

CRU__

CRUS_

CRUST

.29 (.22)

32 (.18)

.54 (.19)

.78 (.15)

.94 (.16)

Remember

.65 (.41)

.71 (.28)

.70 (.27)

.69 (.25)

.62 (.27)

Know

.09 (.21)

.21 (.23)

.18 (.21)

.18 (.17)

.29 (.23)

Guess

.08 (.22)

.06 (.13)

.12 (.17)

.12 (.14)

.18 (.12)

Remember

.23 (.21)

.25 (.18)

.40 (.23)

.56 (.26)

.59 (.28)

Know

.03 (.09)

.06 (.07)

.09 (.11)

.13 (.12)

.27 (.22)

Guess

.02 (.10)

.01 (.03)

.05 (.07)

.08 (.09)

.06 (.10)

.04 (.10)

.08 (.09)

.14 (.16)

.30 (.30)

.64 (.35)

Recall

Relative
Proportions

Absolute
Proportions

Familiarity

Note. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Familiarity refers to the know proportions
transformed with the IRK procedure.
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